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FACT PLEADING, NOTICE PLEADING,
AND STANDING
David M. Robertst
All too often judges and law professors alike condemn the
technicalities of the procedural methods and then turn about
and for lack of understanding achieve results more technical
than any experienced student of the history of procedure
would think of even suggesting.... [A] brilliant court may
show a general impatience with procedural delays and faults
only to make some of the strangest of procedural rulings, either
without appreciating their significance and how far they are
departing from modern viewpoints or in an endeavor to rid
themselves of unattractive cases through an assumed pro-
cedural fault. But such omissions come back to plague us
mightily.
-Charles Clark
The law of standing has undergone a complex transforma-
tion during the past two decades. In its 1962 decision in Baker v.
Carr2 the Supreme Court substantially relaxed the doctrine's fre-
quently illogical and inflexible barriers against judicial review of
government activities. With that case the Court began to re-
examine the standing doctrine, apparently searching for a firm
conceptual foundation upon which to set this most "complicated
specialty of federal jurisdiction." 3 This effort, however, has
largely miscarried. Although standing's earlier rigidity has sub-
stantially softened,, its notorious illogical flaws remain. And in
practice it is applied more capriciously than ever before.
This malaise cannot be traced to any single cause, but an im-
portant factor has been the Court's consistent failure to appreciate
elementary procedural considerations, 4 particularly in the area of
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A. 1964, Wesleyan Uni-
versity; J.D. 1967, University of Missouri-Columbia.
' Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 304 (1938), reprinted in C.
CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE 73 (1965) [hereinafter cited without
cross-reference as CLARK].
2 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.).
4 The late Judge Clark observed that the inability to grasp the implications of proce-
dure is an historic failing of the legal profession:
[W]hile a greater degree of legal sophistication is usually needed than in the
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pleading. In its more than forty years5 of existence federal "notice
pleading"' has achieved widespread acceptance. This consensus
evaporates where standing is concerned. At various times during
the past ten years the Supreme Court, while manipulating access
to courts through the standing doctrine, has managed to apply
pleading standards ranging from conventional notice pleading to
the most stringent and anachronistic fact pleading.
This confusion over standing's relationship to notice pleading
has generated consequences far more serious than mere offense
to the procedural purist. It has thwarted the policies behind
notice pleading. In addition, it has hampered the Court's efforts
to fashion a rational, equitable, and consistent law of standing.
Despite the extensive and valuable literature7 on standing, sur-
prisingly scant attention has been paid to this phenomenon or to
any facet of the procedural context in which *substantive standing
doctrine must function.' A study of the relationship between the
substantive and procedural sides of standing can therefore pro-
vide a fresh-and badly needed-perspective.
This Article will begin with a broad survey of the elements of
this relationship-notice pleading and substantive standing
substantive field to appreciate subtle nuances of procedural causes and effects
and their interrelation, yet the subject is often approached with a blitheness,
indeed a naivet6, on the whole appalling. There are, however, natural reasons
for this, which stem from the apparent simplicity of the subject and the small
regard for it currently held by the profession.
Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 493, 496-97 (1950), reprinted in CLARK 128.
5 The federal rules were adopted by the Supreme Court on December 20, 1937 (302
U.S. 783 (1937)), and became effective September 16, 1938 (McCrone v. United States, 307
U.S. 61, 65 (1939)). 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3181, at 250 (1973) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as WRIGHT & MILLER or, for
volumes co-authored by E. Cooper, as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
6 The term "notice pleading" has achieved wide currency as a convenient shorthand
description of the federal approach to pleading. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957). Nowhere, however, do the federal rules use that term, and Judge Clark, one of the
most influential of the rules' authors, objected vigorously to it as a vague and inappropriate
"abstraction." Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 457 (1962), re-
printed in CLARK 156. Similar reservations are voiced in 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1202, at
63-64 (1969). The ambiguity of the federal pleading standard contained in rule 8(a)(2) is
partially responsible for this debate over characterization of the standard. See text accom-
panying notes 184-86 infra.
7 For references, see 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3531, at 175 n.1 (1975).
8 There are two notable exceptions. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Ac-
tion: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 425-26 (1974) (standing
should be viewed as a substantive question not separate from merits); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 667 (1973) (standing cases can
turn on technical rules of pleading).
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doctrine-and of the inconsistent ways they have been manipu-
lated by the Court. It will then examine in more detail the history
of the current confusion regarding the role of pleading in stand-
ing. The causes and costs of this confusion will be explored in the
third part of the Article.
This exploration will show that although some confusion de-
rives from each element of the pleading-standing relationship, the
principle difficulty is with substantive standing doctrine, not
notice pleading. Based on this analysis, the remainder of the Arti-
cle will then suggest modifications of standing doctrine to cure
these difficulties.
I
CURRENT STANDING AND PLEADING DOCTRINES
A. Standing Generally
The roots of the standing requirement lie in article III's
cryptic restriction of the federal judicial power to "cases" and
"controversies." 9  Since it is not self-evident what qualifies as a
"case" or "controversy" 10 several related concepts, collectively
called "justiciability," have been developed. A complex blend of
constitutional requirements and policy considerations,"' the vari-
ous justiciability doctrines traditionally have been viewed as hur-
dles that must be cleared at the threshold of litigation before a
court may proceed to the merits. Thus, if the court finds that
plaintiff is asking only for an advisory opinion, 12 or finds that the
parties have the same rather than opposing interests, ' 3 it will pro-
ceed no further and will dismiss the action immediately. Similarly,
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
10 As Chief Justice Warren once observed, "[TIhose two words have an iceberg quality,
containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very
heart of our constitutional form of government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
Although "case" occasionally is distinguished from "controversy," such usage is compara-
tively rare. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3529, at 147. The two terms will be used
synonymously throughout this Article.
11 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-97 (1968). Compare Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 480, 488-89 (1923) (taxpayer standing denied) and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J.) (plaintiff can
have standing only in cases that would have been heard in eighteenth century England and
America) with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962) (voter standing granted to allow
suit to challenge debasement of voting power).
12 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). See also 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER
§ 3529, at 154-62.
1" Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971). See also 13
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3530.
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it will dismiss if it finds that the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
resolution' 4 or, conversely, that they have been rendered moot by
developments subsequent to the filing of the action. 15
Standing is easily among" 'the most amorphous' "16 of the jus-
ticiability doctrines. It focuses on the identity of the party seeking
to get his claim or defense before a federal court rather than on
the particular issue he wishes to have adjudicated. The question
of standing is whether a litigant is a proper person to seek adjudi-
cation of the issue, and not whether the issue itself is justicia-
ble. 17  For example, in the so-called jus tertii, or third party
standing cases, courts must decide whether a litigant may assert in
his own behalf rights vested in a third person. Classic cases of this
type concerned doctors' attempts to assert their patients' constitu-
tional privacy rights to use birth control devices.'
Questions of standing arise in a wide variety of factual and
legal contexts. This Article will focus on the area generating the
greatest current concern and confusion: the standing of a private
plaintiff to obtain judicial review of the legality of government
actions. t9 Despite this limitation, standing questions still arise in
extraordinarily diverse situations. As a taxpayer, a plaintiff may
seek to establish his standing to challenge government expen-
ditures at the federal,2 ° state,21 or local 22 level. In addition, by
"' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127-29 (1973). See also 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER
§ 3532.
15 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 315, 317 (1974). See also 13 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER § 3533.
" Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Judicial Review: Hearings on S. 2097
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
498 (1966) (statement of Paul A. Freund)).
,T Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
Is Compare Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (per curiam) (no standing where
constitutional rights of another are raised in declaratory judgment action) with Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (acknowledging standing to raise constitutional rights of
others as defense to criminal prosecution).
19 Many interesting topics could not be dealt with in this Article. A prime question
concerns a defendant's standing to raise certain defenses. See, e.g., Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223 (1973) (criminal); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (civil). In addi-
tion, there is the question of standing in actions between purely private parties. See generally
Tyler, Private Antitrust Litigation: The Problem of Standing, 49 COLO. L. REV. 269 (1978). A
final topic not fully discussed here is third party or jus tertii standing. See generally Sedler,
Standing to Assert Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
20 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing granted); Frothing-
ham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (taxpayer standing denied).
I, See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (no taxpayer standing to
challenge state law requiring Bible reading in public schools because no financial injury was
alleged).
22 See, e.g., Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1880) (resident standing granted to
challenge county creation of debt).
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virtue of his status as a citizen, a plaintiff may seek standing to
challenge government action.2 3  Or he may seek standing as a
competitor of someone benefited by government action. 4
As presently articulated by the Supreme Court, the principal
touchstone of standing is "injury in fact," requiring proof that
plaintiff was injured by the particular government action he seeks
to challenge. Thus the Supreme Court denied the Sierra Club
standing to challenge the legality of United States Forest Service
plans for commercial development of a wilderness area. 25  The
Court never reached the merits of the challenge because, it said,
there was no indication that the organization or any of its mem-
bers had ever used the wilderness area or would in any way be
adversely affected by its development. 
6
Injury in fact would seem to be a simple test for standing,
but several Supreme Court opinions have introduced considerable
complexity by radically restricting the range and types of qualify-
ing "injuries." A purely abstract injury will not suffice; 27 it must
be a "concrete, 28 "particularized" injury not shared by the public
generally. 29 The Sierra Club, for example, could not base stand-
ing upon its or its members' interest in seeing that the Forest
Service abide by its own rules and regulations, for such interest
was merely abstract and undifferentiated from the general public
interest in lawful governance. Standing has been further compli-
cated by the Court's sporadic emphasis upon elements of causa-
tion and remediability,30 involving intricate proof that plaintiff's
injury was caused by the government activity and that it can effec-
tively be remedied by judicial action. The inherent difficulties of
these requirements have been magnified by the Court's pro-
cedural treatment of them- particularly in the area of pleading.
23 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (citi-
zen standing denied for challenge to Congressmen's holding of additional government
positions in violation of incompatibility clause).
24 See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (standing granted
to challenge FCC's granting of license to competitor); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA,
306 U.S. 118 (1939) (no standing to sue federal government as competitor).
25 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
26 Id. at 735.
27 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-25
(1974).
28 See, e.g., id. at 224; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974).
29 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177
(1974).
30 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rig~ts Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618
(1973).
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B. Pleading Generally
The development of federal notice pleading is well known
and need be sketched here only briefly. 31 Until New York
adopted the Field Code 32 in 1848, 33 a general theory of pleading
was unnecessary and nonexistent since in common law procedure
each form of action had its own discrete pleading formula. In
common law pleading, plaintiff's most difficult preliminary task
was not drafting the initial pleading but choosing the correct writ
from among the variety available.3 4  Once he had selected a writ,
the language of his declaration followed largely as a matter of
course. 
3 5
The Field Code, which was quickly adopted in most other
American jurisdictions, 3  required that the initial pleading contain
a "plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of
action without unnecessary repetition." 37  Widespread misun-
derstanding of and resistance38 to this "fact pleading" standard
soon resulted in an unwieldy hierarchy of "facts," only a fraction
of which could properly be pleaded. The courts developed three
categories of pleaded facts: "evidentiary facts," "conclusions," and
"ultimate facts."' 39 Only ultimate facts satisfied the pleading stan-
dard; evidentiary facts and conclusions within a pleading could
not state a claim.40 This scheme placed considerable emphasis on
" See generally Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-L The Background, 44
YALE L.J. 387 (1935), reprinted in CLARK 8; Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-
I. Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291 (1935), reprinted in CLARK 43.
" The New York Code of Civil Procedure was popularly known after its principal
author, David Dudley Field. See generally C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 7, at 22 (2d ed.
1947); R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 355-59 (4th ed. 1978).
'3 Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings, and Proceedings of the Courts
of the State, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497.
34 See 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 145, at 445 (1959).
35 Although the initial pleadings could vary within a given form of action the writ
chosen by the plaintiff dictated the essence of a declaration. Within a particular form there
was much less flexibility-and hence more certainty-in common law pleading than in
either code or federal practice.
6 C. CLARK, supra note 32, § 8, at 24-25.
37 Act to Amend the Code of Procedure, ch. 479, § 142, 1851 N.Y. Laws 887. This was
a modification of the similar but somewhat more prolix standard established three years
earlier in the original code. See generally Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Plead-
ings, and Proceedings of the Courts of the State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521.
38 See 5 R. POUND, supra note 34, § 146, at 486.
39 The most significant distinction was between ultimate facts and conclusions. Accord-
ing to one influential scholar, a conclusory allegation had "a legal coloring," while an alle-
gation of ultimate fact presented the facts "in their actual naked simplicity." J. POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES § 423, at 640 (5th ed. 1929).
40 Thus condemned to the special hell reserved for conclusions were, for example,
allegations that defendant was "indebted" to plaintiff (Aetna Ins. Co. v. Heneley, 215 Ky.
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hypertechnical artifices of pleading and produced inconsistent
judicial interpretations of the adequacy of a complaint's allega-
tions. 41  Contemporary scholars stressed the high social cost of
the system, 42 arguing that any gains in precise issue-identification
came at the expense of many otherwise valid claims that were
dismissed for inadequate pleadings.
43
Further efforts at pleading reform finally culminated in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effective in
.1938.4 4 The key provision, rule 8(a), abolished fact pleading and
required only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief. ' 45  This provision was de-
signed to avoid the distinctions drawn under the codes among
evidentiary facts, ultimate facts and conclusions.
46
Surprisingly, not until Conley v. Gibson,47 nineteen years later,
did the Supreme Court end all doubt and emphatically lay the
fact-conclusion dichotomy to rest. In a passage which, together
with rule 8(a), has remained the general keystone of federal
pleading, 48 the Conlev Court held:
45, 284 S.W. 425 (1926) (allegation conclusory); but see Gillespie Bros. v. Page, 87 S.C. 82,
68 S.E. 1044 (1910) (allegation allowed)), and that one person was the "heir" of another
(Cohen v. Doran, 58 Fla. 418, 51 So. 282 (1910) (allegation insufficient); but see Dibble v.
Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N.E. 145 (1910) (allegation sufficient)).
41 For example, a general allegation of "ownership" appears usually to have been ac-
cepted as one of ultimate fact. See Aronson & Co. v. Pearson, 199 Cal. 295, 249 P. 191
(1926). But see Lapique v. Walsh, 50 Cal. App. 82, 195 P. 296 (1921) (per curiam) (in
bank).
With respect to certain matters, such as the bare allegation of "consideration," there
never was widespread agreement. Compare Magee v. Magee, 174 Cal. 276, 162 P. 1023
(1917) (allegation sufficient) with California Packing Corp. v. Kelly Storage & Distrib. Co.,
228 N.Y. 49, 126 N.E. 269 (1920) (allegation conclusory and insufficient). Negligence was
an especially troublesome area. Although a naked allegation that someone was "negligent"
was usually treated as a mere conclusion (see C. CLARK, supra note 32, § 47, at 298), there
was little agreement as to the degree of additional detail required (compare Hanson v. An-
derson, 90 Wis. 195, 62 N.W. 1055 (1895) (sufficient to allege defendant drove carriage at
high speed and negligently collided with plaintiff's carriage) with Kramer v. Kansas City
Power & Light Co., 311 Mo. 369, 279 S.W. 43 (1925) (insufficient to allege that defendant's
actions caused unreasonably unsafe condition because that is conclusion-must allege what,
in fact, defendant did do or should have done)).
4" See, e.g., 5 R. POUND, supra note 34, § 146, at 492-501; Cook, Statements of Fact in
Pleading under the Codes, 21 COLuM. L. REV. 416 (1921).
43 It was estimated in 1918 that in American jurisdictions using code pleading one
judgment in twenty was reversed on a question of pleading. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31
HARV. L. REV. 501, 507-09 (1918). Even this study, however, failed to deal with the more
pressing problem: inefficiency of code pleading at the trial level.
14 See note 5 supra.
'5 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
46 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 1216, 1218, at 115, 133-34.
47 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
48 Irr an earlier case, United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 187-88
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In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief....
The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set
forth specific facts to support its general allegations of dis-
crimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The deci-
sive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require
is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.
49
The Conlev Court further stated that notice pleading rejected the
notion that pleading should be "a game of skill in which one mis-
step by counsel may be decisive to the outcome." 50  The task of
further issue-identification was assigned to discovery and other
pretrial procedures where it would be accomplished more accu-
rately and economically. 5 '
C. Application of Notice Pleading to Standing
Although standing may be an extraordinarily difficult ques-
tion in certain cases, it does not require special rules of pleading.
In particular, its uniqueness does not compel resurrection of the
artificial and trap-laden distinction between "facts" and "conclu-
sions." Conley indicates that allegations of standing-as any other
element of the plaintiff's claim-should be construed liberally; a
dismissal motion should be denied if facts consistent with plain-
tiff's allegations can reasonably be hypothesized which, if proved,
would support standing. Just as precise and ultra-specific identifi-
cation of every tiny technical element of a cause of action is not
demanded at the pleading stage, it should not be expected in the
area of standing. Similarly, discovery and other pretrial pro-
cedural mechanisms should be employed to identify and develop
(1954), the Supreme Court had also rejected the conclusion-ultimate fact dichotomy under
the federal rules. Employing Plasterers', however, never achieved Conley's notoriety and is
cited with relative infrequency.
49 355 U.S. at 45-46, 47 (citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944);
Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942); Leimer v. State Mut.
Life Assur. Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940)) (second footnote omitted).
50 355 U.S. at 48. See also note 6 supra.
51 355 U.S. at 47-48; 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1202, at 59-60.
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relevant facts and issues surrounding questions of standing. Fi-
nally, logic suggests that any deviations from accepted pleading
norms should not occur without substantial justification.
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP),52 decided by the Supreme Court in 1973, fulfilled
most of these expectations by reconciling standing to notice plead-
ing standards. Disturbed by orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) granting temporary rate surcharges to substan-
tially all of the railroads in the United States, five law students
formed an unincorporated association which then sought judicial
review of those orders. SCRAP's complaint alleged that its mem-
bers had suffered injury in fact because the increased freight rates
would discourage recycling of waste materials, thereby increasing
air pollution and other environmental damage. 53 Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, recognized that the line of causation alleged
in the complaint was "attenuated ' 54 but held the complaint was
sufficient to withstand a dismissal motion. The legal sufficiency of
the allegations, he held, should be tested through the summary
judgment process. 55 To defendant's objection that the complaint
was too imprecise to allow formulation of responsive pleadings,
he suggested that sufficient clarity could be achieved by rule
12(e) 51 motions for a more definite statement, together with nor-
mal civil discover .'
7
Although this was an unexceptional application of federal
notice pleading, it did not go unchallenged. Justice White, in dis-
sent, observed:
52 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
53 Justice Stewart summarized the allegations:
Specifically, SCRAP alleged that each of its members was caused to pay more
for finished products, that each of its members "[u]ses the forests, rivers,
streams, mountains, and other natural resources surrounding the Washington
Metropolitan area and at his legal residence, for camping, hiking, fishing, sight-
seeing, and other recreational [and] aesthetic purposes," and that these uses
have been adversely affected by the increased freight rates, that each of its
members breathes the air within the Washington metropolitan area and the
area of his legal residence and that this air has suffered increased pollution
caused by the modified rate structure, and that each member has been forced
to pay increased taxes because of the sums which must be expended to dispose
of otherwise reusable waste materials.
Id. at 678.
54 Id. at 688.
55 Id. at 689.
56 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
57 412 U.S. at 689 n.15.
398 [Vol. 65:390
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To me, the alleged injuries are so remote, speculative, and in-
substantial in fact that they fail to confer standing. . . . [If these
allegations] are sufficient here, we are well on our way to per-
mitting citizens at large to litigate any decisions of the Govern-
ment which fall in an area of interest to them and with which
they disagree.5 8
What is most noteworthy about both SCRAP opinions is not
that they differed regarding the sufficiency of plaintiff's standing
allegations. It is, rather, the appalling casualness with which each
approached the whole problem of pleading. Justice Stewart's
majority opinion, for example, squarely rested on Conlev princi-
ples, yet he failed even to hint at the existence of that case or of
rule 8(a). Nor was Justice White's dissent any better crafted.
Whatever their disagreements, both opinions shared an unstated
premise that problems of pleading are self-answering, too trivial
to warrant careful analysis. 59
However unsatisfactory its analytical process may have been,
the Court in SCRAP appeared committed to the application of
normal notice pleading principles in the area of standing. Its re-
solve lasted precisely two years. In Warth v. Seldin60 plaintiffs chal-
lenged certain zoning ordinances and practices of the town of
Penfield, New York, that were allegedly designed to exclude per-
sons of low and moderate income from residing in the town.
Their complaint alleged several concrete injuries that the chal-
lenged practices had inflicted on them personally.6" Although
theseallegations clearly met Conley and SCRAP standards,
6 2
Justice Powell, for the majority, ruled them insufficient. He char-
acterized the allegations as fatally "conjectural" 13 and "con-
clusory."64  Making clear that this was not just a slip of the pen,
Id. at 723.
5' Later sections will demonstrate that the Court's opinions have continued to share
this premise, even as the quagmire has deepened. See notes 94-157 and accompanying text
infra.
60 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
6 For example, one group of plaintiffs, property owners in the nearby city of Roches-
ter, alleged that Penfield's exclusionary zoning practices had increased their city's tax rates
by forcing low-income residents into Rochester where they were subsidized. Id. at 496.
Other plaintiffs alleged that the practices had prevented them from acquiring residential
property in the town, thus forcing them and their families to live in less attractive envi-
ronments. Id. Still another plaintiff, an association of building contractors, alleged that the
challenged practices had deprived its member firms of profits by preventing construction
of low- and moderate-cost housing in Penfield. Id. at 497.
62 Compare especially the allegations in SCRAP, summarized in note 53 supra.
63 422 U.S. at 509.
64 Id. at 503.
1980]
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Justice Powell then held that "[p]etitioners must allege facts" 65
from which the necessary causation and remediability could be in-
ferred.
[I]t is within the trial court's power to allow or to require the
plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by af-
fidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed suppor-
tive of plaintiff's standing. If, after this opportunity, the plain-
tiff's standing does not adequately appear from all materials of
record, the complaint must be dismissed.
We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge
exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that
he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's
intervention. 66
No comfortable gloss can be put on Warth's resolution of the
standing issue. It is grounded in expediency, not in logic and cer-
tainly not in earlier cases or the federal rules. Justice Powell's
opinion failed to acknowledge the existence of rule 8(a) or Con-
leV; 67 nor did it make more than the most superficial of references
to SCRAP. 6 8  As Justice Brennan observed in dissent: "To require
[plaintiffs] to allege such facts is to require them to prove their
case on paper in order to get into court at all, reverting to the
form of fact pleading long abjured in the federal courts." 9
65 Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 501-02, 508 (first and second emphases added) (footnote omitted).
Further underscoring the distance Justice Powell put between himself and Conlev are
repeated instances where he construed specific allegations most strongly against the
pleader-drawing all possible inferences negating the conclusion of standing. Id. at 505
n.15, 507 n.16. Justice Powell concluded that certain plaintiffs had not adequately pleaded
actual injury. He based this conclusion on observations prefaced by such qualifications as
"apparently," "it is doubtful," "the matter is left entirely obscure," "presumably," "strongly
suggests," and "must be assumed." Rule 8(f), of course, commands that "[alll pleadings
shall be construed so as to do substantial justice." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f). This reflects a
preference for resolving lawsuits on their merits and not at the pleading stage; rule 8(f),
thus, has been interpreted as abolishing the code practice of construing pleadings most
strongly against their drafters. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1286, at 381.
67 But the opinion does cite Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969), for the
proposition that the complaint is to be liberally construed in ruling on a dismissal motion.
422 U.S. at 501. If Warth reflects a "liberal construction," one can only wonder what a strict
construction would have produced.
66 Its most pertinent reference to SCRAP, ironically, is for the proposition that " 'plead-
ings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable.'"
422 U.S. at 509 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
6'9 Id. at 528. Justice Brennan also noted, probably correctly, that the specificity de-
manded by the Court was "unachievable." Id.
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Just as SCRAP had appeared to commit the Court to the use
of normal notice pleading principles in the area of standing,
Warth appeared to signal resurrection of a particularly harsh vari-
ation of fact pleading. But such a conclusion would be hasty. Al-
though in both cases the Court examined in detail the pleadings
and their construction, it never approached the task in a system-
atic fashion. In neither case did it undertake even a cursory
examination of pleading standards or of their relation to standing.
Both cases share a bland unconcern about the subject. Thus, de-
spite their significant impact on pleading standards, neither case
can be considered a purposive enunciation of a uniform standard
of pleading in the area of standing.
The recent decision in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group 70 buttresses the conclusion that the Court has
failed to adopt a consistent standard of pleading, whether
"notice," "fact" or otherwise. The plaintiffs in this class action
were landowners and residents of property located near two nu-
clear plants being constructed in North and South Carolina by the
defendant. 71 They challenged the constitutionality of the Price-
Anderson Act's 72 imposition of a $560 million liability ceiling for
nuclear accidents involving federally licensed nuclear power
plants. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, held that
plaintiffs had standing. Although the complaint contained allega-
tions that could have been labeled unacceptably "conclusory" and
"conjectural" 73 under Warth, the Court swept past them and
avoided the difficult choice between the very different pleading
philosophies of SCRAP and Warth by simply ignoring them.
Absolute consistency is rarely found in any area of law, but
the extreme discord among SCRAP, Warth, and Duke Power is un-
usual. The resolution of this problem of the relationship between
pleading and standing should begin by tracing in some detail how
it evolved.
70 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
7' Id. at 67.
72 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
73 The complaint was amended twice. In its final form it contained allegations that:
"there is not insubstantial risk of a nuclear disaster" (Second Amended Complaint at 31
(emphasis added)); "[i]f such a disaster occurs, the aggregate amount of damage ... will in
all probability exceed [the statutory limit]" (id. (emphasis added)); "[b]ut for [the statutory
limits on liability] Duke ... at the very least would obtain insurance" (id. at 32 (emphasis
added)); and, lastly, that the granting of declaratory relief would "cause Congress to amend the
Price-Anderson Act so that adequate provisions are made to fully insure plaintiffs and




EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Traditional View of Standing: Legal Rights and
Direct Injury Tests
For many years, standing was usually formulated in terms of
whether the right or interest plaintiff was attempting to vindicate
was "legal." 4 Only holders of legal interests were granted stand-
ing to challenge government action impairing those interests.7 5 Jus-
tice Frankfurter provided the classic statement of this approach:
[A] court will not decide a question unless the nature of the
action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the relation-
ship between the parties are such that judicial determination is
consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of
the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the
Constitution was framed....
... A litigant ordinarily has standing to challenge gov-
ernmental action of a sort that, if taken by a private person,
would create a right of action cognizable by the courts. Or
standing may be based on an interest created by the Constitu-
tion or a statute. But if no comparable common-law right exists
and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been
created, relief is not available judicially. 76
Justice Frankfurter also touched upon a corollary of the legal
rights test: plaintiff's injury must have been the "direct" and not
merely the consequential result of the challenged activity. 77 Prob-
ably the most notable application of this principle occurred
twenty-eight years earlier in the archetypical taxpayer standing
case, Frothingham v. Mellon.7 8  The Frothinghan Court denied
plaintiff standing as a taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality
of federal expenditures under a program to reduce maternal and
infant mortality. The impact upon any taxpayer of such expendi-
tures, it held, "is shared with millions of others; is comparatively
74 This Article will use the terms "legal rights" and "legal interests" interchangeably to
denote the traditional approach to standing. For an excellent brief discussion of its formu-
lation, see 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3531, at 177-84.
" The injury had to be "a wrong which directly results in the violation of a legal
right." Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
" Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150, 152 (1951) (con-
curring opinion) (citations and footnote omitted).
7 Id. at 153-54.
-8 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation,
of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating, and un-
certain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive
powers of a court of equity."
7 9
During this period the Supreme Court virtually ignored the
semantics of plaintiffs' allegations of standing. Specifically, on
standing issues it disregarded the fact-conclusion distinction, even
during the code pleading era,8 o apparently because the legal
rights view of standing required only minimal consideration of
facts unique to a particular plaintiff.8' This conception of standing
focused on broader considerations: the class of persons of which
plaintiff was a member and the class of claims to which his claim
belonged. This approach resulted in a number of distinct and
rigid standing doctrines aimed at general types of plaintiff-claim
combinations. Thus, for example, a businessman had no standing
to challenge the legality of government action that benefited a
competitor. 82 The plaintiff's identity and the severity of his in-
jury had only minimal significance. Similar doctrinal absolutism
attended taxpayer standing: Frothingham's prohibition applied to
all taxpayers and all expenditures alike. 83
Whether such doctrines were well-founded in justice, logic, or
policy, their application demanded relatively little from the plead-
ings. Even the most general of complaints usually revealed its ap-
propriate pigeonhole for standing purposes and, consequently, its
ability to survive a demurrer. Artifices of pleading thus played a
correspondingly minor role in standing doctrine.
79 Id. at 487.
80 Ironically, the only significant attention paid to technical pleading rules with respect
to standing occurred after adoption of the federal rules. Two dissenting opinions contained
the argument that the allegations of standing were conclusory rather than factual, hence
not well-pleaded, and should not survive a dismissal motion. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 197-98 (1951) (dissenting opinion, Reed, J.); FCC v.
NBC, Inc., 319 U.S. 239, 260-61 (1943) (dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
81 In addition, evidentiary hearings had been held in several cases at the district court
level. With the records in those cases thus expanded, there was less need to resolve stand-
ing by reference to the pleadings alone. See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118 (1939); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Alexander Sprunt &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930); Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v.
United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923).
82 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940); cases cited in note 81 supra. But cf.
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940) (plaintiff granted standing as
representative of the public interest). The barriers to competitor standing have been
gradually lowered. See Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). And at least
where administrative proceedings are governed by § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. 1 1977), competitor standing may be granted. See 3 K. DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.11, at 255 (1958).
83 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1938); Duke Power Co. v.
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B. Baker to SCRAP: Substantive Change Begets Procedural Confusion
Whatever the procedural merits of the legal rights approach,
its frequent artificiality and inflexibility of application insulated
too many government activities from judicial review. Thus, the
legal rights model attracted significant criticism, and its shortcom-
ings spurred lawyers to develop alternative approaches. "Injury in
fact" as the sole test for standing emerged as the most influential
recommendation: standing to challenge government action should
be accorded anyone who was actually injured by it.
84
Such arguments began to bear fruit in the 1960's. In the
1962 case of Baker v. Carr, 85 the Supreme Court granted Tennes-
see voters standing to challenge alleged malapportionment of
their state legislature. Baker did not abandon the legal rights view
of standing, 86 but it did signal the Court's movement toward a
more liberal and flexible approach. "[T]he gist of the question of
standing," the Court stated, is whether plaintiffs allege "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of dif-
ficult constitutional questions." 87  This emphasis on plaintiff's
"personal stake" increased six years later in Flast v. Cohen. 88  Es-
chewing Frothingham's blanket prohibition of taxpayer standing,
the Flast Court substituted8 a cumbersome nexus test which per-
Greenwood County, 91 F.2d 665, 676 (4th Cir. 1937), aff'd, 302 U.S. 485 (1938); Scott,
supra note 8, at 673.
84 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis is the principal advocate of this model of standing.
He has noted that the "worst trouble spot in the law of standing is the confusion about the
question whether an adverse effect in fact is enough to confer standing, or whether a
deprivation of a legal right is [also] required." 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 82, § 22.04, at 216-
17. He has further observed:
[T]he state courts that have constructed their own doctrine independently of
the federal doctrine have usually tended toward the simpler, less artificial, and
more satisfactory idea that anyone who is in fact substantially injured by ad-
ministrative action has standing to challenge it. The federal law of standing is a
"specialty of federal jurisdiction" only to the extent that it involves artificialities
that the state courts have refused to adopt.
Id. § 22.01, at 210.
85 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
86 Standing, the Baker Court observed, exists only if a court "is called upon to adjudge
the legal rights of litigants." Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
87 Id.
88 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
89 Frothinghan was carefully distinguished, not overruled. Id. at 104-06. The modifica-
tions were sufficiently radical, however, that henceforth Flast, not Frothinghaln, became the
lodestar in the field of taxpayer standing.
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mitted taxpayer standing to challenge some, but not all, govern-
ment expenditures. " The avowed purpose of the test was to de-
termine the sufficiency of plaintiff's "personal stake." 9
The Court's movement toward a less doctrinaire model of
standing inevitably brought the role of pleadings into sharper
focus. 92 Baker and Flast did not rest solely upon facts peculiar to
each plaintiff; thus they do not represent an abandonment of the
Court's traditional attention to broad class- and claim-based con-
siderations. Indeed, such factors relating to class and claim were
crucial in both opinions, and those considerations remain vital
elements of standing even to the present day.93 But when Baker
and Flast liberalized standing and introduced considerations pecu-
liar to each individual plaintiff-his "personal stake in the
controversy" -the complexity of the problem increased vastly.
Standing questions became much more difficult to determine
solely by reference to the pleadings. The need for an articulated
pleading standard increased correspondingly.
The Court turned to the pleading problem only a year after
Flast. Jenkins v. McKeithen 94 involved a union member's constitu-
tional challenges to the procedures of a Louisiana labor-
management commission that had been established to investigate
illegal labor practices. Although a majority of the Court agreed
that plaintiff had standing, there was no agreement on the plead-
ing standard to be applied.: 5 Justice Marshall's plurality opinion
took an unswerving notice pleading approach: the complaint
10 Professors Wright, Miller and Cooper summarize the Flast nexus test in these terms:
[F]irst, the taxpayer must establish that the statute challenged involves an exer-
cise of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of the Con-
stitution, Article I, Section 8; there is no logical nexus between taxpayer status
and the "incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essen-
tially regulatory statute." Second, the taxpayer must "show" that the challenged
enactment violates specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise
of the congressional taxing and spending power; there is no logical nexus be-
tween taxpayer status and congressional action that merely exceeds the general
delegation of powers to Congress.
13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3531, at 186-87 (footnote omitted).
9' 392 U.S. at 103.
912 Consistent with sporadic dissenting opinions by other justices in two earlier cases (see
note 80 supra), and foreshadowing the trend in later cases such as Warth, Justice Harlan
argued in his dissent in Baker that plaintiffs' allegations were mere legal conclusions and
could not save the complaint from dismissal. 369 U.S. at 338.
'3 See notes 235-40 and accompanying text infra.
94 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
", justice Marshall delivered the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 413. Separate concurring opinions were
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should be liberally construed 96 and dismissed only if plaintiff
could "'prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief.' 97 Not surprisingly, he successfully
hypothesized such facts.9g
Justice Harlan's dissent took a markedly narrower perspec-
tive. Foreshadowing the Court's later emphasis on the pleading of
causation, he argued that "it is not enough for the plaintiff to
allege that he has been or will be injured by the defendant; the
plaintiff must further claim that the injury to him (or those whom
he has status to represent) results from the particular course of conduct
he challenges."99  He then briefly turned to the objectives of fed-
eral pleading:
The prevailing opinion's strained construction of the com-
plaint goes well beyond the principle, with which I have no
quarrel, that federal pleadings should be most liberally con-
strued. It entirely undermines an important function of the
federal system of procedure-that of disposing of unmeritori-
ous and unjusticiable claims at the outset, before the parties
and courts must undergo the expense and time consumed by
evidentiary hearings.
100
Few short-term consequences resulted fromJenkin's failure to
resolve clearly the pleading problem. Opinions handed down dur-
ing the following three years in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp,"0 ' Barlow v. Collins, 10 2 and Sierra Club v.
Morton 10 3 placed greater emphasis on injury in fact as the princi-
pal constitutional standing requirement. They extended the range
of protected interests from traditional liberty or property interests
to include aesthetic, conservational, environmental, and recrea-
tional concerns. 
104
Although these cases did not directly address the role of
pleadings in standing, their approach to injury in fact laid the
filed by Justices Black and Douglas; neither discussed the pleading problem. Id. at 432-33.
justices Stewart and White joined in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Harlan. Id. at
433-43.
There is no indication that either Justice Black or Justice Douglas disagreed with the
adoption of a notice pleading standard for standard allegations.
96 Id. at 421.
97 Id. at 422 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
98 395 U.S. at 423-25.
99 Id. at 434 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
100 Id. at 437.
101 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
102 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
103 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
104 Id. at 734; Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154.
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foundation for further pleading problems. Sierra Club is in this
respect the most significant of the three. 10 5  Plaintiff brought suit
to challenge plans of the United States Forest Service for com-
mercial development of the Mineral King Valley, a wilderness
area in the Sierra Nevada. Relying on its extensive concern with
and expertise in environmental matters, plaintiff asserted standing
as a "representative of the public" to prevent the develop-
ment.' 06  It carefully avoided making any allegations that it or its
members used the Valley or that such use would be injured by the
proposed development.' 0 7  The Court, however, denied standing
based on injury to such an abstract interest. Emphasizing that
plaintiff's injury had to be of a personal, "individualized" na-
ture, 108 the Court stated that the complaint must identify such
injury. 109
The pleading consequences of Sierra Club were indirect but
significant. Even viewed through sympathetic Conley eyes, the
complaint did not allege the individualized injury the Court be-
lieved essential. But the Court did accept the proposition that vir-
tually any injury occasioned by governmental action would confer
standing, provided only that the injury was sufficiently personal.
Plaintiff apparently would have encountered no difficulty had it
simply alleged that the proposed development of Mineral King
would have disturbed at least some of its members' enjoyment of
the valley's scenery and solitude."10
The significance of Data Processing, Barlow and Sierra Club lies
principally in their adoption of injury in fact as the core deter-
105 Data Processing and Barlow, however, generated the most controversy. They estab-
lished a general two-pronged test for determining standing to challenge administrative ac-
tion. First, plaintiff must demonstrate injury in fact. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. Sec-
ond, "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." Id. at 153.
Professor Wright and his colleagues have observed with nice restraint that "[s]ome
obscurity surrounds this [zone of interests] requirement." 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER
§ 3531, at 196. It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the genesis, evolution, and
meaning of this requirement, which in any event does not appear to have operated as a
very serious impediment to the liberalization of standing. See id.; Scott, supra note 8, at 666;
Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REv. 479,
486-87 (1972). But see Hasl, Standing Revisited-The Aftermath of Data Processing, 18 ST. L.
U.L.J. 12, 34-38 (1973).
,on 405 U.S. at 736.
107 Id. at 735 n.8, 740 n.15.
108 Id. at 736, 738-40.
109 Id. at 731-740.
110 On remand, the complaint was so amended, and the dismissal motions were unsuc-
cessful. 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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minant of standing. This revolution of substantive standing doc-
trine overshadowed SCRAP's subsequent use of the traditional
notice pleading standard in the standing context.'11 And yet
SCRAP revealed the considerable judicial problems inherent in
the Sierra Club trilogy of cases. By its marriage of Sierra Club's
emphasis on injury in fact with Conley notice pleading, SCRAP
threatened to deprive the federal judiciary of its only device for
summary resolution of standing questions-the rule 12(b)(6)"1
2
dismissal motion. The determination of injury in fact often is a
highly individualized process, and courts engaged in that process
may often need to examine in some detail the particular facts and
circumstances peculiar to each plaintiff. The dismissal motion,
which sympathetically considers only plaintiff's pleaded allegations,
is not well-suited to this task. After SCRAP and Sierra Club, an
accurate pretrial determination of standing frequently must pro-
ceed through other procedures, especially summary judgment.
The effectiveness of such devices may be limited."1
3
C. The Erratic Revival of Fact Pleading
The revolutionary implications of SCRAP's notice pleading
approach to standing were not realized. The Court quickly moved
to tighten the standing screws again on both substantive and pro-
cedural grounds. Although retaining injury in fact as the focus of
standing, it restricted the concept with a host of limitations, and
no case since SCRAP evidences a generous notice pleading stan-
dard for standing issues.
Giving further substantive definition to injury in fact, the
Court developed the notion that it had to be "specific," "par-
ticularized," and "concrete," not merely an "abstract injury" com-
mon to the public generally. 114 Moreover, the Court did not
hesitate to use the bare allegations of the complaint as the sole
means of characterizing plaintiffs injury. This is illustrated by
Chief Justice Burger's opinions in two 1974 cases. In Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 5" plaintiffs asserted taxpayer
and citizen standing to challenge members of Congress who also
held membership in the armed forces reserves and thus allegedly
violated the incompatibility clause of the Constitution.11 " Plain-
"' For an examination of SCRAP, see text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
112 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
113 See text accompanying notes 192-213 infra.
"'I See notes 27-29 supra.
15 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
116 That clause provides:
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tiffs' theory of injury apparently was that membership in both
groups created a conflict of interests which impaired the officials'
faithful discharge of their legislative duties."1 7 Confidently resolv-
ing the standing issue solely on the basis of the pleadings, Chief
Justice Burger held that it was mere "speculation" that such a re-
sult flowed from the challenged conduct. 1 18 Baker v. Carr, he
noted, established plaintiff's "'personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy'" as the gist of standing,11 9 while the alleged vio-
lation of the incompatibility clause by defendants "would ad-
versely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens in con-
stitutional governance, and that is an abstract injury" insufficient
to support standing.120
Although at first blush the Court's analysis in Reservists re-
sembles that in Sierra Club, 12, Reservists imposed a more restrictive
standing requirement. In both cases plaintiffs had failed to allege
personalized injury in fact, distinct from injuries sustained by the
general public. But the complaint in Sierra Club contained no alle-
gation that plaintiff or its members had actually been injured in
anyway.122  The Reservists plaintiffs, however, had alleged injury
in fact. To be sure, they did not allege injury peculiar to them-
selves, but they did allege that all of the public (themselves in-
cluded) were injured by the conflicts of interests of their elected
representatives. Although the injury undeniably was not unique to
them, it was personal. Application of a liberal Conley pleading
standard would dictate that they be given the opportunity to un-
dertake the proof regardless of its difficulty. Such difficulty seems
not measurably greater than that borne by the plaintiffs in
SCRAP, and the allegation no more "speculative," Chief Justice
Burger's characterization to the contrary notwithstanding.
United States v. Richardson,' 23 a companion case to Reservists,
even more clearly demonstrated the Court's disregard for the im-
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
117 418 U.S. at 212.
118 Id. at 217.
"l Id. at 217-18 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
120 418 U.S. at 217 (footnote omitted).
121 See text accompanying notes 105-10 supra.
12_ See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
123 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
1980] 409
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
pact of standing doctrine on notice pleading. Alleging that he had
been unable to obtain a document setting forth the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's (CIA) expenditures and receipts, plaintiff sought
taxpayer standing to challenge the secrecy of the agency's budget-
ary practices. 124  Chief Justice Burger again wrote the Court's
opinion denying standing, and again he rested his determination
on a narrow construction of the complaint. Plaintiff, he held,
failed to allege that as a taxpayer "he is in danger of suffering any
particular concrete injury."' 23  His grievance was thus "plainly
undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the public.' "126
The complaint would have survived an application of the Conley
standard because, consistent with his allegations, plaintiff could
have established "particularized" concrete injuries. For example,
he might have shown that he needed the information to challenge
a particular CIA expenditure or to publish a salable magazine ar-
ticle about the agency's operations. For plaintiff's failure to dis-
close sufficient factual details-his purpose in seeking
disclosure -Chief Justice Burger nevertheless ruled the complaint
insufficient. 1
27
The Court, adding, to the increasingly restrictive standing re-
quirements enunciated in Reservists and Richardson, subsequently
insisted that pleadings also show causation and "remediability."
The Court's disregard for Conley is illustrated most strikingly in its
treatment of these two concepts. In Linda R. S. v. Richard D.,128
the mother of an illegitimate child sought to enjoin the allegedly
discriminatory application of a Texas statute that rendered non-
support of children a criminal offense. 12 9 Texas courts had con-
strued the statute to apply only to the parents of legitimate chil-
dren and to impose no duty of support on parents of illegitimate
children. Consequently, plaintiff alleged, the father of her child
had been able to escape paying child support. 130  After harking
back to the Frothingham "direct injury" requirement, 131 Justice
124 Id. at 168-69. His claim was based on article I of the Constitution, which provides:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of
all public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
125 418 U.S. at 177.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 175, 176-77.
128 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
129 Id. at 614-15.
130 Id. at 615-16.
131 Id. at 618. For a discussion of Frothingham, see text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
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Marshall emphasized a restrictive focus on the pleading of causa-
tion: plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury
(nonsupport of her child) and the challenged governmental activ-
ity (the state's refusal to prosecute the father). 1
32
This opinion raises two points. First, Justice Marshall's nar-
row construction of the complaint does not square with Conlev. It
was not "beyond doubt" that plaintiff would fail to prove
causation1 3 3-she possibly could establish that prosecution of the
father would result in the payment of child support. That might
not be an inevitable consequence of prosecution but it assuredly is
not inconceivable. 13 4  Second, Justice Marshall's reliance upon
perceived pleading defects almost certainly masks deeper
federalism reservations: whether plaintiff, given the lack of nexus,
was the proper party to ask a federal court to undertake the very
sensitive process of interfering with state prosecutorial proce-
dures. 13 5
Standing doctrine's influence over pleading in Reservists,
Richardson, and Linda R. S. was quite minor and their deviations
from Conlev went nearly unnoticed at the time. O'Shea v. Little-
ton, 136 however, decided the same year as Reservists and
Richardson, made considerably more explicit the Court's departure
from Conley principles. O'Shea was a class action brought by sev-
eral blacks challenging the racially discriminatory enforcement of
state laws by certain state and local officials in Cairo, Illinois.
1' 7
The district court dismissed the complaint. The Seventh Circuit,
however, reinstated it, noting "the underlying motivation of fed-
eral pleading to be to avoid the semantical donnybrooks inherent
in differentiating what is evidence, ultimate facts and conclusions
of law and fact."' 13 8  This faithful application of Conley pleading
132 410 U.S. at 618. Justice Marshall reasoned that "if appellant were granted the re-
quested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the child's father. The prospect that
prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best, be termed
only speculative." Id.
133 The phrase "beyond doubt" is drawn from Conley v. Gibson: "[A] complaint should
not be dismissed ... unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis
added).
134 Justice White, dissenting, wryly characterized the Court's rationale as "a very odd
statement. I had always thought our civilization has assumed that the threat of penal sanc-
tions had something more than a 'speculative' effect on a person's conduct." 410 U.S. at
621.
135 See id. at 619 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)).
136 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
137 Id. at 490-91.
138 Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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principles was then reversed on standing grounds by the Supreme
Court, which enthusiastically threw itself into the "semantical
donneybrook" that the lower appellate court so carefully had
avoided. "[T]he claim against petitioners," wrote Justice White, "al-
leges injury in only the most general terms. ... We thus do not
strain to read inappropriate meaning into the conclusory allegations
of this complaint.... [W]e are .. . unable to conclude that the
case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by general assertions or
inferences .. ,, 139 Thus, the Court required that plaintiffs be pros-
ecuted before they could have standing, even though they con-
tinually lived under the possibility that they would be subjected,
either fairly or unfairly, to the prosecutorial process.
O'Shea clearly revealed that a majority of the Supreme Court
favored an exceedingly strict pleading standard for standing ques-
tions that it has not acknowledged in any other area of federal
law. 140 Warth141 then should have been no surprise when it was
decided the following year. That later decision only made more
explicit the Court's apparent condemnation of "conclusory" stand-
ing allegations and its concomitant demand for "particularized al-
legations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing." 1
42
This demand for particularity surfaced in another decision
handed down shortly after Warth. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization, 143 the plaintiffs were several indigents
and organizations composed of indigents. They challenged the
legality of an IRS revenue ruling relaxing the conditions under
which nonprofit hospitals could obtain favorable tax treatment as
charitable organizations. 144  Plaintiffs objected that the ruling en-
couraged hospitals to deny services to indigents, including them-
selves. 145 Relying principally on the now familiar themes of
Linda R. S. and Warth, Justice Powell applied a constricted view of
the pleadings 46 and found plaintiffs' allegations of causation and
139 414 U.S. at 495-97 (emphasis added).
140 As it was in Linda R. S. (see text accompanying note 135 supra), the Court was also
preoccupied with federalism concerns. See 414 U.S. at 499-501.
141 See text accompanying notes 60-69 supra.
142 422 U.S. at 501.
143 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
144 Id. at 28.
145 Individual plaintiffs recounted incidents where they were denied services because of
an inability to pay fees. Id. at 33.
146 The standing issue actually was joined on defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment. Justice Powell observed, however, that plaintiffs' counteraffidavits in support of
standing merely supported the allegations of the complaint rather than going beyond
them. "Thus, the standing analysis is no different, as a result of the case having proceeded
to summary judgment, than it would have been at the pleading stage." Id. at 37 n.15.
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remediability overly "speculative": 147 "In the instant case respon-
dents' injuries might have occurred even in the absence of the
IRS ruling that they challenge; whether the injuries fairly can be
traced to that ruling depends upon unalleged and unknown facts
about the relevant hospitals."'
1 48
The progression from Linda R. S. to Eastern Kentucky seems
to reflect a conscious adoption of a strict fact pleading standard.
But such a conclusion would be hasty. A more sound conclusion is
that the Court has failed to adopt any consistent standard for the
pleading of standing. Despite its several restrictive decisions, the
Court has consistently refused to overrule or even disparage
SCRAP or Conlev. Furthermore, in at least two cases since Eastern
Kentucky the Court found standing despite standing allegations
every bit as "conclusory" and "speculative" as those Justice Powell
quickly condemned in Warth and Eastern Kentucky. Those cases are
Duke Power,' 9 discussed earlier, and Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 150 decided in 1977.
Factually, Arlington Heights was remarkably similar to Warth.
A real estate developer and several individuals sought to challenge
the constitutionality of village officials' refusal to rezone a tract of
land to permit construction of an integrated, low and moderate
income housing project. 151 Deviating from his approach in Warth
and Eastern Kentucky, Justice Powell devoted little attention to
plaintiffs' standing allegations. As the Court later did in Duke
Power, he chose to ignore the arguably conclusory nature of sev-
eral allegations1 52 and found that causation and remediability had
been adequately averred.'
53
147 Id. at 43.
148 Id. at 45 n.25.
149 438 U.S. 59 (1978), discussed in text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
150 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
151 Id. at 254.
152 For example, with respect to the individual plaintiffs who worked in Arlington
Heights but lived elsewhere, the complaint alleged that each "drives the long distance daily,
a time-consuming trip involving excessive expense," and that each had "been unable to
find, decent housing at a price [he] could afford in the vicinity of [his] job." Complaint at
6-8. To mention but a few other examples, the complaint alleged that minority group
members were "effectively discouraged" from seeking employment in Arlington Heights
(id. at 14); that there was a "desperate need" for "decent housing" in the village (id. at 14);
and that "only society's wealthier members, overwhelmingly white," were permitted to live
in Arlington Heights (id. at 15).
At the same time the complaint, which runs to some sixteen printed pages, is replete
with a vast amount of evidentiary trivia. Perhaps the complaint was so drafted to avoid the
fate that had befallen the plaintiffs in Warth. To a considerable degree its mixture of
evidentiary allegations, "facts" and "conclusions" was probably inevitable-and is a monu-
ment to Warth's demand for fact pleading.
153 429 U.S. at 264.
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The Supreme Court's relative lack of attention to the plead-
ings in Arlington Heights and Duke Power might be attributed to the
lengthy evidentiary hearings held at the district court level in both
cases. 154 With expanded records, the Court's need to rely on
pleaded allegations of standing diminished accordingly. This
rationale, however, creates additional problems. Ruling on the
sufficiency of a pleading is not usually thought to be a discretion-
ary matter. 5' A complaint either avers standing adequately or it
does not."5 ' If the complaint is fatally "conclusory," it remains so
when received by the Supreme Court, even though an evidentiary
hearing may produce additional information. If the Court ignores
defective standing allegations, it then grants the district court dis-
cretion to waive accepted pleading standards, and exercise of that
discretion, moreover, may be essentially unreviewable. If the dis-
trict court finds the allegations of causation, for example, to be
overly "conclusory," it may dismiss the complaint and deny plain-
tiff any opportunity to prove them. On the other hand, if the
district court overlooks the defective averments and allows plain-
tiff an evidentiary hearing at which all he must prove is "but-for"
causation,' 57 the complaint apparently can avoid re-examination
on appeal because once done the evidentiary hearing cannot be
undone.
Equally important, the pretense of a uniform pleading stan-
dard must be abandoned if the district court is given discretion to
waive pleading defects. Pleading then becomes predominantly a
game of forecasting the idiosyncratic predilections of the district
judge in whose court a complaint has been filed. In such a system,
the role of the Supreme Court is reduced to merely articulating a
minimal standard which each of the approximately four hundred
district judges may apply or not, as he desires.
"' A four-day hearing was held in Duke Power (see Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D.N.C.
1977)), while in Arlington Heights the standing issue was resolved after trial on the merits
(see Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 209
(N.D. Ill. 1974)).
155 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1357, at 593-94
138 The rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim "allows of no discre-
tion in the usual sense. The complaint is either good or not good." Mitchell v. E-Z Way
Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 130 (5th Cir. 1959).
'57 The "but-for" causation test appears to have been adopted by the Supreme Court in
Duke Power. 438 U.S. at 77-78.
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III
EXPLANATION AND EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
Recent Supreme Court opinions thus appear to require that
standing allegations must be "factual," "specific," and "concrete,"
not "conclusory," "vague," or "speculative," but they also allow a
district court to disregard such defects if it chooses to order an
evidentiary hearing. This flatly contradicts Conley and rule 8(a)
and completely ignores Justice Brennan's several dissenting opin-
ions vigorously pointing out the inconsistency.' 58 If the Court
has somewhere discovered a rich vein of policy considerations
warranting an exception to notice pleading in the area of stand-
ing, it has not bothered to communicate this discovery. Warth v.
Seldin is a perfect example: plaintiff's standing allegations were
condemned out-of-hand as "conclusory" and "speculative," but
there was no genuine effort to explain this characterization or its
significance.
The Court's ad hoc and erratic reversion to fact pleading in
standing stands as a paradigm of what Judge Clark perceptively
referred to as the "endeavor to rid [itself] of unattractive cases
through an assumed procedural fault."'159  And the "fault" has
been found by a method with a long history in Anglo-American
procedure-the employment of strict pleading rules in judicially
disfavored actions. t Yet this situation is most surprising be-
cause it is occurring in standing, which the Court had earlier
seemed bent on liberalizing, and within the context of the federal
rules, which long had been thought to abolish such pleading doc-
trines.'"' The practical result of the current approach resembles
"' See Eastern Kentucky, 426 U.S. at 62; Warth, 422 U.S. at 520, 525-28; Reservists, 418
U.S. at 236-37.
159 Clark, supra note 1, at 304, reprinted in CLARK 73.
160 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1226, at 162.
161 Standing is not unique in this respect, however. Professors Wright and Miller have
observed that in defamation and malicious prosecution actions the traditionally strict at-
titudes toward pleading have at least partially survived adoption of the federal rules. 5 id.
§§ 1245, 1246, at 217, 224. To these can be added another class of actions newly fallen into
disfavor: private civil rights actions. See text accompanying notes 172-80 infra. Wright and
Miller ascribe this survival to two causes: (1) in such actions the courts are less inclined to
construe the complaint liberally; and (2) if facts essential to avoiding a defense are not
alleged, the courts may assume their nonexistence and dismiss the complaint. Con-
sequently, in such disfavored actions the plaintiff must plead with greater specificity than
usual. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1226, at 162-63.
Professors Wright and Miller are undoubtedly correct in describing what has occurred,
but it is difficult to square that practice with the federal rules. First, those authors do
not give any reasons for the survival of fact pleading other than that courts are "inclined"
to demand it in certain cases. Second, rule 9 identifies several matters which are required
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that of the archetypical standing case, Frothingham v. Mellon," '
which established a conclusive presumption that no taxpayer had
a sufficiently direct interest in federal expenditures to have stand-
ing to challenge them. The principal twist today is that the pre-
sumption is unstated, applied in the guise of construing pleadings,
and-apparently-rebuttable. 163  In addition, it appears to apply
to all areas of standing, not just taxpayer standing.
There are several powerful reasons why the pleading of
standing has been thus handicapped. Since the Court has never
adequately articulated these reasons, a complete study of the
pleading of standing requires their exposition.
A. Historical and Conceptual Difficulties with Notice Pleading
The revival of fact pleading in standing springs from the
deep historical roots of fact pleading itself. When the federal rules
were promulgated in 1938, their embrace of notice pleading was
met with considerable resistance, which slowly subsided but never
entirely disappeared. 164  Practitioners and judges who had grown
accustomed to code pleading were shocked by abandonment of
the traditional distinction between "facts" and "conclusions" and
by disappearance of the notion that only "facts constituting a
cause of action" could be pleaded. They believed that an effective
and efficient procedural system demands precise issue-
identification, accomplished at the very outset of the action, and
that this requires a more detailed complaint than one merely pro-
viding defendant with some vague notice about the general kind
of asserted claim.16 5  Such dissatisfaction was aggravated by a
to be pleaded with greater than normal particularity-fraud, for example. One therefore
would asstime that the drafters did not intend to require extraordinary specificity in other
actions.
162 See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
163 But one legitimately may doubt whether even the most detailed fact pleading
would have succeeded in gaining grants of standing in such cases as Richardson, Reservists,
and Linda R. S. Despite their attention to perceived defects in the pleading of causation,
these cases seem to embody a presumption against standing that is every bit as substantive,
and as absolute, as Frothingham's.
164 See Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 491 (1948); McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside
the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123 (1952); Rothschild, The Federal Wonderland (Some "Simplified"
Federal Concepts), 18 BROOKLYN L. REv. 16 (1951); Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading
Problem, 53 HARV. L. REV. 169 (1939).
165 In evaluating pleading under the federal rules, Judge Fee observed:
Where is no rationale to the pleadings.... [The complaint] cannot be shaped by
motions because there is no basic substratum of legal theory to which it must
conform.
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controversial opinion166 of Judge Clark and finally culminated in
a recommendation of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference that
rule 8(a)(2) be amended to require "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, which
statement shall contain the facts constituting a cause of ac-
tion."' 6 7  Though rejected by the Advisory Committee on the
Civil Rules,' 68 this proposal embodied a philosophy that con-
tinued to find proponents. This was especially true in antitrust
litigation where, during the two decades following adoption of the
federal rules, courts not infrequently voiced a preference for spe-
cial strict pleading rules.'6 9  An influential 1957 opinion17 0 by
Judge Clark took much of the momentum out of this 'movement.
And, of course, Conley v. Gibson, 171 also decided in 1957, reaf-
firmed and extended the Supreme Court's commitment to notice
pleading. After Conley, federal notice pleading appeared to have
emerged from its challenges intact, its opponents silenced if not
converted.
After only a few years' respite, however, several develop-
ments again brought federal notice pleading into question. Coin-
cidentally, these developments arose around the time the Su-
preme Court was undertaking its reexamination of standing. The
first, which began in the early 1960's, was a dramatic increase in
the number of filings of private civil rights actions. '7 2  Many fil-
... As Columbus, he who embarks on a law suit will not know where he is
going. When he comes to the end of the proceeding, he will not know where he
is. The result at times will be astonishing.
Fee, supra note 164, at 494.
166 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). Dioguardi was severely criticized
in McCaskill, supra note 164, at 125-26.
167 Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253, 253 (1951).
168 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) note (1955 Adv. Comm. Note), reprinted in 12 WRIGHT & MILLER
app. F, at 591-92 (1973).
'69 See Alexander v. Texas Co., 149 F. Supp. 37 (W.D. La. 1957); Baim & Blank, Inc. v.
Admiral Corp., 132 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See also 5 WRIGHr & MILLER § 1228, at
166 nn.28 & 29.
170 Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957).
171 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
172 When the federal rules were adopted and for several years thereafter, civil rights
actions were rare. In 1946, for example, out of a total of approximately 68,000 civil cases
filed in the federal district courts, only 40 were civil rights actions. [1946] DIRECTOR OF THE
ADIINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. (Table C 2), reprinted in
[1946] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES REP. 88-89. Annual filings of such
actions slowly increased until the early 1960's, when they rose dramatically. In 1965 they
exceeded one thousand for the first time. [1965] DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. (Table C 2), reprinted in [1965] JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REP. 178-79. In the 12 month period ending June 30, 1979,
the last period for which figures are available, there were approximately 155,000 civil cases
filed; of these, some 25,000 were civil rights actions. This latter figure includes 1,222
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ings were pro se state prisoner complaints, crudely drawn and in-
volving matters of state prison administration in which the federal
courts traditionally have been reluctant to intervene.1 7 3  Many
districts and circuits responded to this pressure by resurrecting
the fact-conclusion pleading distinction.17 4  If the allegations of
such a complaint could be characterized as "vague," "conclusory,"
or "speculative," it became increasingly subject to dismissal. This
trend now has attained great momentum, 175 possibly because of
such a strict standard's perceived "virtue" -judicial ability to dis-
pose summarily of unattractive cases.176  It is most prevalent in
the Second' 7 7 and Third' 7  Circuits as an express exception to
normal federal pleading standards and is recognized in varying
degrees in most other circuits, 17 9 save possibly the Fifth Cir-
non-prisoner civil rights actions in which the United States was named as defendant, as
well as 11,783 prisoner civil rights actions. It does not, however, include 11,218 other
prisoner-initiated actions-principally habeas corpus petitions. [1979] DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. app. 14 (Table C 2).
171 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
174 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 311 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1962).
175 The Supreme Court has never approved such an exception to federal notice plead-
ing. To the contrary, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), militates strongly
against it by holding that pro se inmate civil rights complaints are to be measured against
"less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Id. at 520. The impact
of Haines, however, has been minimal. For an especially labored attempt to harmonize
Haines with the condemnation of "conclusory" allegations in civil rights complaints, see
Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 182 n.2 (3d Cir. 1972).
176 This "virtue" has not gone unnoticed in the habeas corpus context either, where fact
pleading also has supplanted the more relaxed notice pleading standard. See Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1963);
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495-96 (1962); 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976) (appli-
cation for writ of habeas corpus); RuL GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS 4 note (Advisory Comm. Note).
177 See Albany Welfare Rights Organization Day Care Center, Inc. v. Schreck, 463 F.2d
620 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973); Powell v. Jarvis, 460 F.2d 551 (2d Cir.
1972); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1965). But see Williams v. Vincent, 508
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974).
17 See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1976); Kauffman v. Moss,
420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1970); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967); United States
ex rel. Hoge v. Bolsinger, 311 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1962).
179 First Circuit: compare Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1977) with
O'Brien DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Sixth Circuit:
compare Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1971) and Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443
F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) and Sexton v. Barry, 233 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1956) with Puckett v.
Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972). Eighth Circuit: compare Harley v. Oliver, 539 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1976) and Gilbert v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1976) and Anderson v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court, 521 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1975) and Ellingburg v. King, 490 F.2d 1270
(8th Cir. 1974) with Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1976) and Windsor v.
Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1975). Ninth Circuit: compare Sherman v.
Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1977) and Kennedy v. H. & M. Landing, Inc., 529 F.2d
987 (9th Cir. 1976) and Finley v. Rittenhouse, 416 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1969) with Fajeriak
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cuit. 18) Thus, a large segment of the federal judiciary now sys-
tematically applies very strict pleading standards at'odds with
Conlev and rule 8(a), albeit in an exceptional class of cases.
The impact of a related development has been more subtle.
During the past several years federal pretrial practice has come
under increasing criticism by prominent segments of the legal
profession. The focus thus far has been on perceived abuses and
delays caused by the existing rules of discovery. Committees of
the American Bar Association"" and the United States Judicial
Conference 182 have proposed substantial modifications in this
area to expedite the discovery process by providing for early and
precise issue-identification.1, 3  Because the rules on discovery and
pleadings are inextricably intertwined, these recommendations
might be followed by suggestions for changes in the pleading
rules. The most straightforward and obvious way to promote early
delineation of issues is by substituting detailed fact pleading for
the relatively vague notice pleading permitted by rule 8(a)(2) and
Conlev.
Resistance to federal notice pleading is further facilitated by
the semantic slipperiness of both the rule and Conlev. In requiring
v. McGinnis, 493 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1974). Tenth Circuit: Coopersmith v. Supreme Court,
465 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1972).
Results from other circuits are not as clear. Few pertinent cases come out of the
Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits. The Seventh Circuit has wrestled with the prob-
lem in a most interesting fashion. It was one of the earliest of the circuits to dismiss civil
rights complaints that merely contained "conclusory" allegations. See, e.g., Hess v. Petrillo,
259 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1958); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954). More re-
cently, however, it has taken a more sympathetic view. See, e.g., Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d
57 (7th Cir. 1974). Its most pronounced liberalization was in Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d
389, 394 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), where it
noted that federal pleading was intended "to avoid the semantical donnybrooks inherent in
differentiating what is evidence, ultimate facts and conclusions of law and fact." This noble
effort was promptly undercut by the Supreme Court. See text accompanying notes 136-39
supra.
180 Although the Fifth Circuit has occasionally condemned conclusory allegations (see,
e.g., Cook v. Whiteside, 505 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1974)), it has been generally critical of rule
12(b)(6) dismissals of "barebones" pleadings (see, e.g., Covington v. Cole, 528 F.2d 1365,
1373 (5th Cir. 1976)). It has been actively seeking alternative methods of winnowing out
non-meritorious claims. See, e.g., Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1976).
181 ABA LITIGATION SECTION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF
DISCOVERY ABUSE (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
182 UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PRELIMINARY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS];
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 3-5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REVISED PROPOSED AMENDMENTS].
183 Detailed examination of these proposals is beyond the scope of this Article, but a
brief survey is helpful. One significant change recommended by the ABA committee in-
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a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief," rule 8(a)(2) is almost as fuzzy as the older
code standard. What, for example, must one plead in order to
show that he is entitled to relief? Abstract logic could produce a
construction as strict as that existing under the codes.18 4  Nor is
the ambiguity resolved by Conley. Its holding-that a complaint
should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief" 185-overstates the nature of notice
pleading and cannot be taken literally. It would permit a com-
plaint alleging no more than that defendant wronged plaintiff,1
8 6
a position that cannot safely be ascribed to any member of the
Court at any point -in its history.
The erratic revival of fact pleading in standing, then, is by no
means an isolated phenomenon. It is part of a larger environment
in which early, summary disposition of non-meritorious claims is
increasingly demanded and the existing pleading standards are
too ambiguous to prevent a creeping revival of fact pleading as
the favored procedural device. What is most noteworthy about
this slow erosion of federal notice pleading is not the fact of its
occurrence, nor even the reasons propelling it. It is the utter si-
lence in which the process is taking place. There is no frontal
challenge, for example, to the wisdom of rule 8(a)'s proscription
of attempts to distinguish "facts" from "conclusions."' 8 7  And it is
almost as difficult to find any justification for the piecemeal dis-
mantling of notice pleading.8 8  This is truly distressing. What-
volves revision of rule 26(b) to- restrict the scope of discovery to "issues raised by the claims
or defenses of any party," instead of the present formulation which allows discovery of
material relevant to "subject matter involved in the pending action." Another ABA recom-
mendation would modify rule 26(c) to provide for an early'discovery conference where the
"issues to be tried" shall be fixed. ABA REPORT, supra note 181, at 2-7.
The response of the federal Judicial Conference committee has been interesting. With
respect to rule 26(b), it originally recommended dropping the "subject matter" test for
scope of discovery, but without substituting the "issue" standard suggested by the ABA.
PRELIMINARY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 182, at 6, 9-11. But the committee has
apparently abandoned this proposal and has offered no other revision of rule 26(b). RE-
VISED PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 182, at 3. The committee, however, has accepted
much of the substance of the ABA recommendations for an early discovery conference. Id.
at 3-5.
184 See R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
192 (1952).
185 355 U.S. at 45-46 (footnote omitted).
188 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.11, at 86 (1965).
187 See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
188 The Supreme Court's extraordinarily casual treatment of the pleading of standing is
the most egregious example. In the similar resurrection of fact pleading at the circuit and
district court levels in private civil rights actions there have been occasional attempts to
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ever problems are associated with notice pleading-and they are
many-can hardly be resolved unless they are first addressed.
B. Threshold Resolution of Injury in Fact
The resurrection of fact pleading in standing undoubtedly
has been a practice of convenience, enabling the Court to avoid
difficult substantive issues. ' 89  But it also has been the product of
some very real difficulties with current notions of standing. These
difficulties are both procedural and conceptual.
The period from Baker to Sierra Club saw a substantial
liberalization of standing: de minimis injury in fact emerged as
the core standing requirement."' 0 When this concept of standing
is combined with normal Conlev doctrine, however, it may produce
singular inefficiencies. Detailed analysis of injury in fact may in-
volve intricate factual issues regarding the extent and nature of
plaintiff's injury, as well as its causation and remediability. Resolu-
tion of such issues may well demand extensive factual data which
Conlev's permissive acceptance of relatively generalized allegations
is not well-designed to produce at the pleadings stage. Yet stand-
ing traditionally has been viewed as a threshold issue to be re-
solved before the court may turn to the merits of the case. 191
This characterization suggests that the information essential to
determine standing should be available in the pleadings, for if the
matter cannot be determined at that point its later "threshold"
resolution may become exceedingly tortured or even impossible.
SCRAP 192 is a concrete illustration of the problem. An or-
ganization composed of five law students sought to challenge the
legality of the ICC's grant of temporary rate surcharges to most
American railroads. To have standing plaintiffs had to show in-
jury caused by the challenged order. This they accomplished by
justify the creation of an exception to rule 8(a). See, e.g., Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191,
198-99 (2d Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion, Gurfein, J.); Powell v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1964); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601-04 (9th
Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion, Duniway, J.). But even these few efforts have been wholly
unsatisfactory.
189 This may be only a short range benefit at best. The underlying problem in Warth,
for example, refused to disappear and eventually resurfaced in Arlington Heights. See notes
141-53 and accompanying text supra.
ISo And it was so perceived at the time. See, e.g., K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§ 22.01, at 419 (3d ed. 1972). Beyond injury in fact, Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, added
the prudential "zone of interests" requirement, which generated no small amount of confu-
sion. See note 105 supra.
"' See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951)
(concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J.). For discussion of the costs of this view, see Albert,
supra note 8, at 442-49; notes 201-02 and accompanying text infra.
192 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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alleging that the increased shipping rates would discourage the
recycling of reusable waste products, thus increasing environmen-
tal pollution which would in turn impair their recreational use of
"forests, rivers, streams, mountains, and other natural re-
sources." 193 The likelihood of plaintiffs ever proving this "at-
tenuated"' ' 4 chain of causation was remote, at best. But theoreti-
cally they could, and Conley's liberal pleading standard enabled
them to leapfrog defendants' dismissal motions.' 95
Alternatively, the Court suggested that defendants still could
resort to rule 12(e) motions for more definite statements and to
normal civil discovery.19' The utility of the first is doubtful.
However lacking in details the complaint may have been, it was
not so vague or ambiguous that defendants could not have
framed a responsive pleading: 197 plaintiffs' allegations were in-
credible, not ambiguous, and defendants could deny them in all
good conscience. Nor would discovery provide the solution. Al-
though discovery can produce the facts necessary to determine
standing, it cannot by itself resolve the often sensitive standing
questions. Discovery could serve as a foundation for summary
judgment motions on the standing issue, 19 8 but the efficacy of
that procedure for such issues is suspect. Plaintiffs could easily
produce at least some evidence tending to show injury and but-for
causation. And unless the substantive standing doctrine itself be-
comes more restrictive, once the plaintiff presents a genuine issue
of material fact, summary judgment could not be granted.1 99
193 Id. at 678.
191 Id. at 688.
195 Under Conley, the complaint could not be dismissed unless it appeared "beyond doubt
that the plaintiff [could] prove no set offacts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief." 355 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In SCRAP the Court did
not have to hypothesize acceptable circumstances since plaintiffs had already alleged them.
412 U.S. at 689 n.15.
1 These are the only circumstances under which the motion has been permitted since
rule 12 (e) was amended in 1948. Federal civil procedure provides no means for obtaining a
bill of particulars. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1375, at 729-30.
191 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689.
199 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Indeed, although SCRAP had a long and convoluted future
after remand from the Supreme Court, there is no indication in any of the published
reports that plaintiffs' standing was ever again challenged, even by summary judgment
motion. See, e.g., Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
The Eighth Circuit has suggested that despite the statements in SCRAP regarding
summary judgment, "such a disposition will be proper in only a very few and unique cases.
... The court is not to consider the weight or significance of the alleged injury, only
whether it exists." Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156, 168 (8th Cir.
1974). Although this view may accurately reflect what happens in many cases, it is not
consistent with the Supreme Court's teachings in either SCRAP or Eastern Kentucky, 426
U.S. at 45 n.25.
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Ultimately, the only means for accurate resolution of such
injury and causation issues may be through a full scale evidentiary
hearing.2' The cost of such a procedure is a major diversion of
the court's and litigants' energies, for the sole purpose of deter-
mining standing. If standing issues are to be resolved relatively
early in the litigation, with reasonable dispatch and expense, the
dismissal motion is the only effective procedural means presently
provided by the federal rules. And fact pleading, not notice plead-
ing, promotes the use of that motion.
These difficulties are not traceable solely to the demands of
injury in fact analysis for more factual information than is likely
to be produced by Conlev notice pleading. If standing were
considered simply an additional element of plaintiff's claim for
relief, any factual issues could be resolved as all other factual is-
sues are-at trial. The problem arises from the traditional per-
ception of standing as a preliminary question that somehow must
be resolved apart from and before consideration of the merits.
20 1
When that preliminary question involves intricate factual prob-
lems, as would a hearing on standing, the result may be massive
disruption of orderly and efficient litigation processes.
Aside from the practical effects on the litigation process, the
logical flaws of a rigid threshold view of standing can be dem-
onstrated easily. Although injury and causation are ingredients
of standing, they also remain elements of the substantive claim.
Why, then, should injury and causation be torn from their contex-
tual moorings in the substantive claim and submitted in a prelimi-
nary inquisition? Consider an analogous requirement in the law of
private claims. Any ordinary personal injury case, for example,
may present issues of negligence, causation, and damages. All are
jury questions. In a rare case it might be expeditious to require a
finding of damages (or causation) before permitting plaintiff to
prove negligence, but it is difficult to perceive any persuasive
reason for demanding such an awkward procedure in every case.
Yet that is precisely what happens in standing.
2 2
200 Such a hearing is permitted by FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
201 Id. This view is so strongly held that in Data Processing, Justice Douglas gave it as a
reason for rejecting the legal interest approach to standing: "The 'legal interest' test goes to
the merits. The question of standing is different." 397 U.S. at 153.
202 An even more striking analogy exists in the realm of personal jurisdiction. Long-arm
statutes in many states provide for extraterritorial service of process on absent defendants
who have engaged in certain specified activities within the forum state-the commission of
a tortious act, for example. The argument has been made that when jurisdiction is chal-
lenged in such a case the court must find preliminarily that defendant did commit the
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Such difficulties are not the only hurdles presented by em-
phasizing injury in fact. No fundamental unfairness flows from
requiring a plaintiff, who seeks to challenge government action, to
show that he has been injured by it. Indeed, the article III case or
controversy requirement could not be met in the absence of such
injury, unless the Framers intended to sanction the use of judicial
power in vindicating purely abstract principles or satisfying mere
curiosity.2 3  Conversely, there is nothing inherently wrong with
accepting a "trifling" injury as sufficient, provided it is identifi-
able. 204
But demanding some injury in fact can be a much stricter
standard than requiring only injury in fact. A comparison with the
law of private claims is again instructive. Doctrines such as privity,
proximate cause, and duty have long been employed to cir-
cumscribe the range of persons entitled to judicial relief from the
wrongful and injurious acts of others.205 Like standing, such
limitations may be abused and cause individual hardship. They
nevertheless serve legitimate objectives, including the rationing of
relatively scarce judicial resources. If traced with sufficient preci-
sion, the ripples from virtually any human act may reach-and
injure-a far greater number of persons than the judicial system
can accommodate. 20 1  And the potential impact of most private
activities is incomparably narrower than those of the government.
Even if the rationing problem is disregarded, a related diffi-
culty remains. A government activity may injure many different
classes of persons, some more gravely than others. In SCRAP, for
alleged tort. This ingenious argument has been rejected, for it produces the anomalous
result of requiring a preliminary trial on the merits simply to determine the court's power
to reach the merits. Nelson v. Miller, I1 Ill. 2d 378, 392, 143 N.E.2d 673, 681 (1957).
203 The Court has not been so accommodating. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217, 223 (1974). On the bases of historical and policy
analyses, Professors Berger, Jaffee and Scott apparently find no constitutional impediments
to adjudication of such "generalized" grievances. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Ac-
tions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 846 (1969); Jaffee, The Citizen as Liti-
gant in Public Actions: The Non-Hochfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033
(1968); Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265
(1961); Scott, supra note 8, at 674, 691-92.
204 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14.
205 See generally 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 778, at 28-31 (1951); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 41, 53, at 236-37, 325 (4th ed. 1971); Albert, supra note 8, at
438-42; Comment, Implied Warranties-The Privitv Rule and Strict Liability-The Non-Food
Cases, 27 Mo. L. REV. 194 (1962).
206 "In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the
causes of an event go back to the discovery of America and beyond. 'The fatal trespass
done by Eve was cause of all our woe.'" W. PROSSER, supra note 205, at 236.
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example, the ICC order could adversely affect manufacturers of
goods customarily shipped by rail, other shippers, competing
forms of transportation, consumers, and as SCRAP ingeniously il-
lustrates, even those persons who do nothing more than breathe
the air. Should all be given equal standing to challenge the ICC
order, irrespective of the nature and extent of their injury? An
affirmative response follows from an unadorned injury in fact test
as the only requirement for standing; Justice White probably was
correct in observing that SCRAP put the Court "well on [its] way
to permitting citizens at large to litigate any decisions of the Gov-




One can of course argue as a matter of fundamental policy
that any injury, however indirect and minimal, should be enough
for standing.208 But post-SCRAP cases demonstrate that the
Court has not been consistently willing to accept the consequences
of a simple injury in fact test. While purporting to retain that
standard the Court has ringed it closely with prudential and other
limitations so abtruse and impossible to apply rationally that only
a shell of the real injury in fact test remains. To this same end,
the Court also has reverted to the erratic demand for strict fact
pleading. It would seem preferable to acknowledge candidly the
difficulties with injury in fact and to search instead for an alterna-
tive framework for the resolution of standing questions.
C. Evaluation of the Current Approach
The Court's erratic treatment of the pleading of standing has
some limited, although probably unintended benefits. As long as
the Court retains standing as a significant barrier to judicial re-
view of government action, its focus on pleadings will provide
flexibility. Frothinghamn's doctrinaire approach to taxpayer stand-
ing, for example, allowed minimal leeway for considering the
equities even in a compelling case. By contrast, recent standing
decisions present far fewer barriers to judicial review of govern-
ment actions. Although Warth erected pleading obstacles in the
path of challenges to exclusionary zoning practices,2 '09 Arlington
207 412 U.S. at 723 (dissenting opinion).
208 Although this somewhat simplifies his position, Professor Davis has consistently sup-
ported this proposition. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 82, § 22.18, at 291-94; K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.20, at 196 (Supp. 1978).
209 See text accompanying notes 60-69 supra.
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Heights demonstrates that some plaintiffs injured by such practices
may achieve standing.21  The costs of such flexibility, however,
are unacceptably high. It can mask the exercise of unexplained
and unbridled discretion not to entertain certain actions. 21' The
Court's failure to address the inconsistencies and unworkability of
substantive standing law through reliance on ad hoc pleading doc-
trines is even more costly.
21 2
Another arguable advantage of fact pleading is that it facil-
itates early appellate review of standing questions. Despite its
erratic application of strict fact pleading, the Court may have en-
couraged district courts to dismiss in close or novel cases, thus
effecting early appeals before the possibly useless investment of
energies on the merits. Considerable economies may result, given
the blurred and uncertain contours of standing doctrine. 213
Nevertheless, the anomalies that the Court has introduced
into the pleading of standing are disconcerting. The Court has
never explained its reasons for deviating from normal pleading
principles. It has not candidly acknowledged even the existence of
the deviation. The problem is not simply that prospective plain-
tiffs cannot determine the degree of specificity for alleging stand-
ing; that could be circumvented by cautious overpleading. 214 The
210 See text accompanying notes 150-53 supra. This is not to say that such plaintiffs are
better off than if they were simply denied standing, since the Court ruled against them on
the merits in Arlington Heights. On the authority of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), it held that plaintiffs must prove that the purpose of the defendants' refusal to
rezone was to discriminate; proof merely of a racially disproportionate impact was not
sufficient. 429 U.S. at 264-65.
This raises another question not discussed in Arlington Heights: with what factual
specificity must plaintiffs allege discriminatory purpose? Before the current emphasis on
pleading facts in standing and private civil rights actions, one could have predicted with
some confidence that discriminatory purpose need be alleged only generally, without sup-
porting factual particularity. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). That still may be true, but the cau-
tious pleader today probably should plead as many relevant facts as possible.
211 Justice Brennan has made this point. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 520 (dissenting
opinion). See also 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3531, at 82 n.63.22 (Supp. 1978).
212 Professor Lewis made a similar point with marvelous prescience in 1962, when the
revolution in standing doctrine was just beginning.
So long as standing serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all
the various elements of justiciability, and serves interchangeably with other
terms, such as ripeness, to sum up a judicious exercise of discretion in the use
of the reviewing power, its convenience alone likely will preclude the Court's
adoption of greater precision in the use of the concept. By the same token,
discovering what the Court intends to convey when it relies on the concept will
become increasingly difficult.
Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REv. 433, 453 (1962).
21 This justification is weakened considerably by the availability of other means for
early appellate review, especially 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
214 When a court is hostile to plaintiff's claim, however, even overpleading carries the
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Court's careless commingling of pleading and substantive doctrine
may render it impossible to predict rationally whether any allega-
tion will suffice, no matter how carefully crafted. Since plaintiffs
can never be certain of the extent to which the attention paid
pleadings in such cases as Warth and Linda R. S. masks other un-
stated concerns, their value as precedent is diminished. These un-
certainties encourage suits that should not be filed, defense mo-
tions that should not be made, district court decisions that cannot
be sustained, and circuit court opinions whose fate in the Su-
preme Court is utterly unpredictable. In short, general pleading
standards are unascertainable. Form is not only elevated over sub-
stance, but the form is unknown and unknowable. This unpredict-
ability is particularly unfortunate in an area such as standing,
where the impact of the judicial process may have extraordinary
constitutional and social dimensions. A more complete antithesis
to the rational scheme envisioned by the drafters of the federal
rules is unimaginable.
There are other equally grave consequences of the Supreme
Court's erratic and unpredictable attitude toward pleadings. First,
it may be counterproductive to the efficient and economical de-
velopment of issues in a given case. In the standing area, as
elsewhere, the issues presented may be purely legal (formulation
of an abstract standard), purely factual (whether a given event or
act occurred), or a mixture of law and fact (whether the occur-
rence of a given event or act satisfies an abstract standard). Confu-
sion of pleading doctrine with substantive principles may obscure
this identification of issues and prevent their assignment to pro-
cedurally appropriate modes of resolution.2 1
5
Second, creating an exception to Conlev and rule 8(a) princi-
ples ignores hard lessons of procedural history and reform. The
universality of the federal rules, which promotes an informed and
consistent body of adjective law, will be severely undermined by
risk oT providing ammunition that can be used against the pleader. See, e.g., Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544
F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
2"5 Linda R. S. illustrates this problem. The trial court could have viewed standing as a
purely legal question, appropriately resolved by ruling on a dismissal motion with no need
to consider any actual evidence of causation. Such a ruling would have rested only mini-
mally on the factual particularity with which plaintiff had alleged causation, for the decisive
issue was whether as a matter of law the nexus between nonprosecution and nonsupport
was sufficiently direct. On the other hand, the court could have considered the nexus issue
as purely factual, resolvable only after an evidentiary hearing at which plaintiff was given




elusive and inconsistent alterations of its pleading requirements.
Such piecemeal modifications may also have unfortunate and un-
foreseen effects in other areas of the highly interdependent fed-
eral procedural system; for example, related concepts, such as
summary judgment, may suffer similar fates.2 16  Even more ob-
viously, the Court by relying on subtle pleading principles has
forgotten that the failure of fact pleading under the codes con-
tributed significantly to adoption of the federal rules.217 Con-
struction of the complaint can be useful in determining whether a
judicially cognizable claim for relief has been asserted in litiga-
tion between private individuals. It can also play a significant role
in evaluating standing to challenge government action. But it is no
more realistic in standing than elsewhere to demand that all, or
even most, issues be resolved solely by reference to the pleadings.
When pleadings-based standing decisions are appropriate, they
should result from a fair and sympathetic reading of the com-
plaint, not from semantic hairsplitting. In particular, courts need
not revert to a rigid fact-conclusion pleading dichotomy. That
approach proved illogical and counterproductive in the pleading
of private claims; it can function no better in the pleading of
standing.
Finally, such incursions on rule 8(a) and Conley may have
ramifications far beyond standing. We already have noted the
tendency of many circuit and district courts to erect special plead-
ing requirements in private civil rights actions.218 The Supreme
Court's similar treatment of standing can only encourage this de-
velopment. 21 9  Once opened, the gates of special pleading may be
difficult to close.
The choice of procedure can be crucial in such a case, for plaintiff may be able to
prove causation if the trial judge treats standing as essentially an evidentiary problem-the
Duke Power approach. See 438 U.S. at 72. But if the judge considers standing as predomi-
nantly a legal problem, plaintiff may never have that opportunity. This appears to be what
the Supreme Court actually had in mind in Linda R. S., despite its dicta about the allega-
tions of causation being "speculative." 410 U.S. at 618. In any event, considerable conse-
quences may flow from the characterization of the problem as "legal" or "factual," but the
Supreme Court has given precious little guidance about the making of that characteriza-
tion.
216 See note 199 supra.
217 See notes 39-46 supra.
218 See text accompanying notes 172-80 supra.
219 As demonstrated by his dissent in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), Justice
Rehnquist needs no encouragement. In Cruz, a state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against various corrections officials based on allegations that they had unconstitutionally
discriminated against his practice of Buddhism. In an unexceptional application of Conley,
the Supreme Court reversed the rule 12(b)(6) dismissal granted and affirmed below. Dis-
senting, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court had "never dealt with the special pro-
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IV
INTEGRATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL FACETS OF STANDING
The difficulties with the pleading of standing are too funda-
mental to be resolved by minor tinkering with either the pleading
standard or the substantive law of standing. SCRAP and Warth
illustrate the problems resulting from the thoughtless overlay of
both notice and fact pleading on current standing principles.
Neither case offers an entirely satisfactory approach: while
SCRAP's adoption of notice pleading proved, in the Court's sub-
sequent view, too radical an expansion of standing, Warth's retreat
to strict fact pleading eviscerated federal pleading policy and un-
duly confused the law of standing itself. The difficulties, for the
most part, are traceable to the Court's failure to appreciate the
inherent conflict between notice pleading and current substantive
standing doctrine. The situation requires a systematic accommoda-
tion of both concepts; any successful solution will entail a radical
rethinking of at least one.
The awkward and often artificial refinements that the Court
has added to standing's core concept, injury in fact-nexus, cau-
sation, and remediability -suggest that the root of this conflict
lies with the standing doctrine and that difficulties with notice
pleading are only symptomatic of standing's fundamental doctri-
nal deficiencies. A reappraisal of standing is therefore preferable
to the abandonment of notice pleading. At least two alternatives
are available.
The Court should abandon or substantially modify its tradi-
tional perception of standing as a threshold issue. This view has
been persuasively criticized 220 and is logically and pragmatically
unsupportable. 221 It not infrequently has been ignored in prac-
tice.222
cedural problems presented by prisoners' civil suits." Id. at 323. He then suggested one of
the most extraordinary pleading standards ever conceived: such claims would be enter-
tained only if the complaint alleged "facts showing the difference in treatment between
petitioner and his fellow Buddhists and practitioners of denominations with more numer-
ous adherents could not reasonably be justified under any rational hypothesis." 405 U.S.
at 326. In other words, he proposed to stand Conley on its head. How one canfact plead a
negative is something of a mystery.
220 See Albert, supra note 8, at 427-29, 442-50, 490-97.
221 See text accompanying notes 191-202 supra.
222 See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 475 (1938) (district court's find-
ing of standing after "full hearing" including merits issues reversed by Court); Edward
Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1923) (district court's
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Substantive standing doctrine has enjoyed considerable
liberalization over the past twenty years. The substitution of injury
in fact for the legal rights standing model, together with recogni-
tion of "public action" litigation, opened the standing door to a
wide variety of plaintiffs and spawned a proliferation of chal-
lenges to government action.223  In the Court's eyes, the interac-
tion of this liberalized approach with notice pleading proved
intolerable. The reversion to strict fact pleading reflects an at-
tempt to retain standing as a significant access barrier.
2 24
This process has seriously impaired the integrity of federal
procedure. And the damage has been gratuitous. No pleading
standard, fact or notice, can effectively screen cases on standing
grounds. Substantive standing doctrine is just too convoluted, em-
phasizing ambiguous concepts 225 whose resolution often requires
a fully developed evidentiary record. Summary, threshold deter-
mination of standing frequently is impossible.
Standing's voracious appetite for facts can easily be recon-
ciled with notice pleading, but only if courts are willing to delay
standing issues until trial. Although this reform deviates from
present theory, it eliminates the conflict between the pleading and
standing doctrines while providing beneficial side effects. Specific
facts material to standing can be presented and resolved most ef-
fectively in litigating the merits.226 The cost and delay of a pre-
liminary hearing on standing would be avoided.
This proposal would undermine the effectiveness of standing
as a door-closing device. But such an effect would be less substan-
tial than prior incursions. The expansion of standing beyond the
legal rights model already largely vitiated its door-closing utility,
regardless of any partial regression in cases like Warth. Deciding
standing issues at trial would work little additional ill.
Thus, notice pleading and substantive standing law can
coexist in their current forms if standing decisions can be delayed
until trial. Even if jurisdictional considerations require that a court
denial of standing after "final hearing" affirmed by Court); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 209 (N.D. 111. 1974) (standing decided
after trial on merits), rev'd on other grounds, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
223 See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1379-83, 1389-92 (1973).
224 See notes 114-57 and accompanying text supra.
225 Causation and remediability are examples, as are the ephemeral "concrete" and "par-
ticularized" qualities of injury in fact. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
226 "1 would let the case go to trial and have all the facts brought out. Indeed, it would
be better practice to decide the question of standing only when the merits have been de-
veloped." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
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find standing before deciding the merits, standing and merits is-
sues may be developed and tried simultaneously, following normal
federal practice. If plaintiff's standing allegations satisfy normal
Conlev standards, then a court should exercise its discretion under
rule 12(d) and defer the standing determination until trial.
227
While this alternative reconciles standing and notice pleading
by eliminating the point of conflict, it fails to address critical in-
adequacies of substantive standing doctrine. The amorphous qual-
ities of the injury in fact test and its prudential overlays have led
to the erratic, unpredictable application of standing doctrine.
Only a principled reformulation of substantive doctrine can cure
this defect. While the precise contours of a principled standing
law are difficult to plot, it may be possible to discern the doc-
trine's general shape.
A satisfactory reformation of standing can proceed only after
a recognition of the failings of past efforts. The abstract nature of
the concept defies attempts to isolate the "essence" of standing.
"Standing" is merely a conclusion and not a tool of analysis; it is
devoid of content and useful only as a label for a number of
complex, and frequently different, problems.
Given, then, that standing has no single "essence," endeavors
to articulate an all-encompassing formula must be imprecise or
overly broad to the point of futility and counterproductivity. The
injury in fact standard provides a typical example. This liberal test
is simple and predictable in application; most plaintiffs have
standing because most offending governmental actions could gen-
erate at least some trifling injury.22 8 An unadulterated injury in
fact standard, however, is so broad that it fails to sort cases on
justiciability grounds. It does not guarantee that plaintiffs granted
standing are the best representatives to bring the case and sharpen
the issues. But the Court's imposition of additional screening
criteria beyond injury in fact has complicated the pristine stan-
dard, sacrificed predictability, and rendered the "injury in fact"
label imprecise. 29
227 Rule 12(d) gives federal courts the discretion to defer the hearing and determina-
tion of all rule 12(b) defenses until trial.
228 See Monaghan, supra note 223, at 1380-83, 1389-92.
229 Moreover, the Court has so overburdened standing that the doctrine is now
hopelessly confused with other justiciability and avoidance concepts with which it has
strong ties, such as abstention, political question, and mootness. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-8, at 53-56 (1978); 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER
§ 3529, at 152-54; Scott, supra note 8, at 683. A separate standing rubric has only a limited
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A principled standing rule must meet all these objections.
The answer, surprisingly, has always been close at hand and,
paradoxically, repudiates all overarching standing models. Stand-
ing's similarity to the cause of action concept provides a useful
analogy for designing an analytical framework for the resolution
of standing questions.2 30  The Flast nexus requirement and the
Data Processing zone of interest test closely resemble the familiar
cause of action 231 components of duty and proximate cause. The
legal rights model of standing, with its classifications of injured
interests and plaintiffs, made this connection quite clear. For
example, Frothingham denied taxpayers standing to challenge the
validity of government expenditures because of the insubstantial
nature of their injury.232 If the case had been a private litigation,
the attenuation between delict and injury, a notion essentially
identical to the Frothingham rationale, would prevent plaintiff
from establishing his cause of action. The two cases differ only in
that the plaintiff in the private litigation is denied relief as a mat-
ter of substantive law.
value as an abbreviated and imprecise description of certain vague variables in an interre-
lated set of problems collectively comprising the justiciability of claims against the govern-
ment. See Sedler, supra note 105, at 481-82. As Justice Frankfurter observed: "Justiciability
is ... not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its
utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures .... " Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508
(1961) (concurring opinion). Whatever the justiciability classification into which a case most
neatly falls, the ultimate question remains constant: whether the plaintiff may adjudicate
the legality of a given government action on specific grounds. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968). Standing may emphasize plaintiff's identity; ripeness and mootness,
temporal factors; and the abstention doctrine, prudential considerations. None, however,
can be resolved in a vacuum. By themselves, particular facts regarding plaintiff's identity
are utterly meaningless and acquire relevance only when there is something to which they
can be related-a particular claim for relief. And claims always are made within a tem-
poral, social and judicial context.
Running through the standing decisions, for example, are repeated references to non-
constitutional, prudential considerations justifying the denial of standing. See, e.g., Single-
ton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1976) (jus tertii standing); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498-500, 509-10, 517-18 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196-97
(1974) (concurring opinion, Powell, J.); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-94, 98-99 (1968).
And in such decisions as Linda R. S. and Reservists, standing and pleading doctrines have
been severely stretched in order to avoid reaching the merits. These practices are nothing,
more than disguised forms of abstention, but the Court has made no effort whatever to
integrate them into a coherent whole.
230 Professor Albert has previously noted this similarity. Albert, supra note 8, passim. See
also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 151-57 (2d ed. 1973).
231 "Cause of action," the operative code terminology, is used here as synonymous with
"claim for relief," the more modern phrase.
232 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
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The cause of action concept once suffered from the defini-
tional dispute now plaguing the standing doctrine. 233  The break-
through for cause of action analysis came with the realization that
the concept lacked a unitary definition. Once the quest for an
all-encompassing formula was abandoned, attention could focus
on factors governing whether a cause of action should be recog-
nized, or should be implied from a statutory duty.
234
Courts could profitably recast standing methodology along
similar lines. Standing analysis should not replicate private cause
of action analysis; cause of action criteria are not necessarily ap-
propriate to standing 235 and in any event are continually evolving.
Rather, courts should adopt a similar process and directly analyze
whether plaintiff should be permitted to bring the case. A de-
tailed explication of the appropriate methodology is beyond the
scope of this Article, but its general direction is clear; it, like im-
plied cause of action analysis, must focus on broad class- and
claim-based factors. Rather than concentrating exclusively on the
facts of each plaintiff's idiosyncratic injury, 236 courts should
scrutinize the general nature of the injury, its relationship to the
challenged activity, and the availability of a remedy created by de-
cisional or statutory norms.237
233 For a collection of references regarding this debate, see Clark, supra note 1, at 313
n.37, reprinted in CLARK 69, 79 n.37.
234 The drafters of the federal rules appreciated this, with the result that nowhere in
those rules does reference appear to the "cause of action." See Clark supra note 1, at 314,
reprinted in CLARK 69, 80.
233 Professor Albert has argued persuasively that private rules of law reflect a "consid-
ered adjustment of... [the] conflicting and competing ... purposes, aspirations, motives,
and interests that are associated with individual and institutional private conduct. ... Ordi-
narily the interests and purposes behind government activities and the harms they produce
do not correspond with those of private persons." Albert, supra note 8, at 443-44.
13' This is not to say that the magnitude of injury cannot and should not be considered
in public standing or private cause of action litigation. But such factors should neither be
exclusive, nor even predominant.
237 There is nothing startling or novel about this approach to standing. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has continued to rely upon class- and claim-based considerations even dur-
ing its flirtation with injury in fact. The most obvious example is the distinction it has
consistently drawn between taxpayer standing and citizen standing. See, e.g., Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 n.15 (1974). The kinds of injuries
involved in taxpayer suits are frequently different from those involved in citizen suits.
Resulting from'an increased tax liability, the injury in taxpayer suits is limited to the plain-
tiff's pocketbook. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1968). The range of injuries
asserted in citizen suits is broader. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 210-11 (1974) (conflict of interest of elected officials). Plaintiffs often
claim different kinds of injuries in the same case. See id. at 211. But the greater importance
of these standing classifications is that they reflect wide differences in the representative
status asserted by the claimants; the boundaries of taxpayer and citizen groups frequently
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The advantages of this approach are noteworthy. Courts
would address the ultimate issue directly; they would not be di-
verted or led astray by the intricacies of applying a less elemental
formula. They could openly consider the whole range of histori-
cal, political, jurisprudential, and other policy concerns always rel-
evant to standing. Because a cause of action-type analysis would
categorize plaintiffs more in terms of classes and claims than
idiosyncratic facts, predictability would be improved. This test
would also reconcile standing with notice pleading. Prior to Baker
v. Carr, with the similar analytical emphasis and reduced need for
particularity in pleading of the now-defunct 238 legal rights
model, 239 courts resolved standing issues with a minimum of fuss
and bother about pleading technicalities, even though fact plead-
ing was dominant during much of that era.2 40  This alternative
approach would borrow the legal rights model's compatibility with
are not coterminal. The same might be said of the types of delicts and of the dispositive
legal norms. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer suit alleging violations of
first amendment, establishment, and free exercise clauses); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (citizen suit alleging violations of incompatibility
clause).
238 Professor Monaghan has observed that the erosion of the legal rights approach to
standing resulted primarily from the rise of the administrative agencies, which generated
irresistible pressure to accord judicial review to anyone adversely affected by administrative
action. Monaghan, supra note 223, at 1380.
Another explanation is that, although the courts recognized that the sources of "le-
gally protected interests" could be statutory and constitutional (see note 76 and accompany-
ing text supra), they tended to emphasize another source, the law governing private claims.
As Professor Albert has pointed out, this focus was misplaced. See note 235 supra. It inevi-
tably distorted the law of standing and produced results poorly grounded in policy and
justice, thus discrediting the model itself.
Finally, the legal rights approach is not analytically satisfying. The objective of any
inquiry into standing is to determine whether the constitutional or statutory rule at issue
supports the grant of standing. It is not whether that rule "creates" a "legal interest." The
natural tendency, therefore, is to focus directly on standing, eschewing legal interest de-
terminations as unnecessary abstractions.
239 Professor Scott identified four factors that appear to have been influential in deter-
mining standing under the legal rights model: (1) the size of the group protected or ben-
efited by the legal rule relied on; (2) the "directness" of the adverse effect on plaintiff; (3)
whether plaintiff's injury merely resulted from increased competition; and (4) whether a
public agency existed which was charged with protecting the interests of persons in plain-
tiff's position. He noted that the list could be extended and that it reflects considerations
which are conventionally treated as questions going to the merits, Scott, supra note 8, at
652-54.
240 See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra. The principal contributing factor was
an almost subliminal perception of the similarities between justiciability (including standing)
and cause of action concepts. That is, the analytical focus was upon establishing appro-
priate classifications of injured interests and plaintiffs; only tangentially did the inquiry in-
volve facts unique to the injury sustained by a particular plaintiff.
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), aff'g 21 F. Supp. 947 (E.D.
Tenn. 1938), exemplifies how unique facts can tangentially come into play under the legal
434
NOTICE PLEADING AND STANDING
notice pleading, although the new test need not be as substan-
tively restrictive; its liberality would depend on the factors
employed to assess standing and their relative weights. In addi-
tion, the proposal's class- and claim-based considerations would
not commonly present narrow fact questions and would corres-
pondingly reduce the need for particularity of pleading or for
tedious discovery. Resort to summary judgment procedure
likewise would become less frequent.
241
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions reflect a determined
desire to retain standing as a significant preliminary barrier to at
least some challenges to government action. This vision is quite
difficult to reconcile with SCRAP's joinder of notice pleading and
simple injury in fact. But the resulting retreat from SCRAP has
turned into a rout, and all sense of direction has been lost in the
process. The Court has overlaid injury in fact with a number of
substantive restrictions which may be charitably characterized as
opaque. Simultaneously, it has apparently abandoned SCRAP's
procedural prop, notice pleading. Given the traditional view of
standing as a threshold issue, the Court's revival of fact pleading
reflects an understandable desire to resolve standing as early in
the litigation as possible, through dismissal motions directed to the
complaint. If injury in fact remains the cornerstone of standing,
rights approach to standing. Claiming violation of their rights under the fifth, ninth, and
tenth amendments, sixteen power companies sought to enjoin TVA from competing with
them in the generation and sale of electric power. The Supreme Court held that the plain-
tiffs had no standing since "damage consequent on competition, otherwise lawful, is in such
circumstances damnum absque injuria, and will not support a cause of action or right to sue."
306 U.S. at 140. Plaintiffs had also alleged fraudulent and coercive conduct by TVA which,
if true, would have rendered the competition unlawful. Id. at 144-45. The allegations -of
fraud and coercion had raised fact questions that could be resolved only by trial. 21 F.
Supp. at 950.
The crux of the analysis was whether certain classes of claims and plaintiffs merited
judicial protection from injurious government activities, not whether plaintiff had sustained
such an injury as to acquire a sufficient "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."
The passage from Tennessee Electric clearly illustrates this old overlap between cause of
action and standing concepts. See also Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 21
(1942) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
241 Most complaints can be expected to reveal with sufficient clarity the general nature
of the claim asserted and the class of persons to which plaintiff belongs. If a complaint is
so vague or conclusory that it fails to give even this minimal information, it is unlikely that
defendant reasonably could be expected to respond to it; thus defendant will likely make a
rule 12(e) motion to compel the necessary specificity.
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the burdens of its resolution may be greatly magnified by shifting
the procedural emphasis to other pretrial mechanisms such as dis-
covery and summary judgment.
Nevertheless, the Court's assault on notice pleading has been
unwise for several reasons. First, strict fact pleading casts too
broad a net, ensnaring cases where standing should be granted as
well as those where it should not. To whatever degree this con-
sequence has been avoided, it is only because the Court has
employed the doctrine selectively. Such unexplained selectivity it-
self injects needless confusion into an already difficult area. Sec-
ond, fact pleading measures only the relative specificity with
which allegations are made, not their content vis- L-vis standing. It
cannot effectively serve the substantive function of distinguishing
between justiciable and nonjusticiable controversies. Third, fact
pleading has considerable liabilities even as a purely procedural
means of issue-identification. It encourages prolix, boilerplate
pleadings by plaintiffs who naturally seek to cover every possible
contingency, and it promotes dilatory defense motions which are
based on nothing more than technical semantic grounds. Both re-
sponses tend to confuse the issues, not to clarify them. Fourth, in
the cases where the Court has condemned standing allegations as
"conclusory," its logic has been pure ipse dixit, untainted by any
hints of reasoned analysis. Fifth, and most important, its facile
manipulation of pleading principles has diverted the Court from
formulating a comprehensive and workable approach to standing.
It should stop treating symptoms and instead direct its energies to
the causes of standing's current malaise: the post-Baker emphasis
on each plaintiff's idiosyncratic "personal stake in the con-
troversy" and the corollary of injury in fact. The Court should
directly face the difficult policy issues involved in standing by
either resolving standing issues after the merits have been de-
veloped or returning the focus to substantive class- and claim-
based considerations, paralleling cause of action analysis.
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